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I. INTRODUCTION 
1. Analogy as a Perennial Theme 
Analogy is a perennial theme in both philosophy and theology. The widely 
differing outlooks and terminology used in technical discussion of the 
subject easily lead to confu~ion .~  One knows well enough that analogy 
belongs to some types of epistemology and is applied in different ways in 
religion. However, the interrelations of its various forms, attribution and 
proportionality, intrinsic and extrinsic, analogia entis and analogia fidei, 
require clarification. Analogy has long been used to describe the nature and 
attributes of God. It would be a mistake to suppose that it offers any omni- 
bus resolution of the problem of "God talk." On the contrary, questions 
must be answered about the nature of analogy itself with respect to content 
as well as orientation. Yet as a point of reference analogy does call attention 
to the importance of both language and structure. 
The Hebrew-Christian tradition premises a transcendent deity who is at 
the same time immanent in the world. The faith claim that God is the source 
and end of all life has a variety of theological expressions. Biblical language 
itself is dramatic and metaphorical.Wod is believed to be known in the 
mighty acts which reveal his presence and reality. In order to be systematic, 
theology as well as philosophy is required to ask about the metaphors and 
analogies which are used in religious speech, God has been described as 
king, father, and even as a shepherd. Of course, these terms are not intended 
to be understood literally. Are they, then, only figures of speech, or do they 
identify continuing relationships and meanings? The larger question is 
whether religious language yields knowledge of a transcendent reality or  
only of man himself. Is theology anything more than anthropology? 
The theme of analogy relates to the contemporary discussion of herme- 
neutic at a number of crucial points.3 Analogy represents a traditional way 
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of justifying "God-talk." It is an oversimplification to  regard it merely as 
an epistemological vehicle. In its wider ramifications, the problem of 
analogical knowledge involves not only linguistics and logic, but the inter- 
relation between different aspects of experience. The respective roles of 
faith and reason as well as theology and philosophy are in the background 
of its discussion. Assuredly, the contemporary investigation of hermeneutic 
is not to be identified with this single theme, yet the issues at question are 
not entirely different. Consideration of the problematic of analogy serves 
to broaden reflection on religious language as well as to relate it to historical 
traditions. The relations between immanence and transcendence are crucial 
in its definition. Analogy is a subtle and complex reference, and not limited 
to any single context or formulation, attribution or proportionality, being 
or  faith alone. Although it need not be defined exclusively in terms of 
current debates, it ought not to be isolated from them entirely. Basically, it 
is a theme worthy of consideration in its own right. 
Traditional explication of analogy has treated it as a mean between 
equivocation on the one hand and univocation on the other. Equivocation 
is really meaningless and without truth vaIue. Univocation, on the other 
hand, premises unambiguous knowledge, disregarding mystery, Analogical 
predication has the intent of avoiding both extremes. Of course, the 
problem can be oversimplified as well as confused by this set of distinctions. 
The terminology of even the most elementary analogical predication of the 
divine attributes is more complicated than this threefold division.4 Inter- 
preters have differed widely on the priorities to be assigned to the analogy 
of attribution and analogy of proportionality, respectively, from Cajetan 
to Suarez to the present. More recently, discussion has focused on the 
differences between the analogy of faith and the analogy of being. There are 
theologians as well as philosophers who charge that the set of questions 
associated with the theme is characteristically scholastic, having been dis- 
placed in modern critical epistemologies. Yet it should be noted that the 
theme of analogy continues to appear under such diverse viewpoints as 
modern linguistic philosophy and existential theology. The more abiding, 
primary question is whether analogy-as a middle way-opens positive 
possibilities for reflection and description. 
Epistemologically, this reference needs to be defined critically with clearly 
identified first premises. Christian theologians have claimed that analogy 
belongs more appropriately to theism than to pantheism, deism, naturalism, 
or agnosticism.5 It is generally agreed that analogy deals with the basic 
problem of likeness and difference, and more appropriately than metaphor 
represents an attempt to delimit carefully the use of symbols. In its Christian 
theological context, analogy joins immanence and transcendence. Of course, 
analogy should not be used to beg fundamental questions about God's 
existence or  transcendence. Analogy, however, does clarify the kind of 
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which is relevant as well as the kind of language appropriate to 
description of deity. Seen in historical context, it is more characteristically 
Greek than Hebrew; it became a self-conscious reference as Christian 
thought encountered Greek ontological categories.6 Nonetheless, it also 
has Biblical bases. Analogies can be taken from both the natural world and 
history. In the case of the Greeks it was primarily the former, and for the 
Hebrews the latter. To the extent that analogy belongs to faith seeking 
understanding, it inevitably shares the problems which appear as religious 
experience becomes reflective. The basic question is not whether Christianity 
accepted Greek philosophical perspectives, but only how it adapted them 
to its usage. Were its faith claims illumined and clarified or were they 
mitigated in an abstract intellectualism? 
Christian theologians have employed analogy in a very specific and 
precise way. It does not signify that they have controlling knowledge of the 
God-man relation-only that real, although not exhaustive, knowledge of 
God is possible. Use of such a relational perspective in the explication of 
Christian experience has had a long conceptual development. In the 
scholastic period, analogy was used in the formulation of the natural 
theology which Thomistic thinkers still accept in principle.' Traditionally, 
Protestants have argued for faith alone, scripture alone, and grace alone. 
Such claims, however, do not settle all questions of knowledge or being. 
In the modern period, Protestant thinkers have used analogy in a wide 
variety of ways, ranging from the natural theoIogy of liberalism to the 
confessionalism of Karl Barth's analogy of faith. Analogy, like hermeneutic, 
premises an understanding of the relation between event and symbol, 
conviction and concept, in the attempt to define carefully what is affirmed 
about God. By his very nature, the God of the Bible is not just one reality 
among others, a being with other beings. He is believed to be the source of 
creation as well as righteous, living will. Can his reality and nature be 
described analogically in terms of likeness and difference? 
2. Contemporary Relevance 
Bishop John Robinson's Honest to God raised the problem of religious 
language in a dramatic way with the phrase, "our image of God must go."s 
E. L. Mascall has written in critique: 
from the beginning the Church has interpreted its notion of God 'up there' as  analogical, 
as is shown by the fact that it has supplemented it by the equally analogical notion of 
God as everywhere. . . . any mental picture of God may be a hindrance if it is taken uni- 
vocally in its unqualified everyday sense, even such biblical pictures as that of 'Father' 
and 'Shepherd,' but . . , ordinary Christians find very little difficulty in making the neces- 
sary adjustments, while professional intellectuals might be expected to know something 
about the discussions of Christian theologians on the analogical nature of our language 
concerning God.9 
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Professor John MacQuarrie of Oxford University has posed the question 
of analogy in a contemporary setting: 
of all our ways of talking about God, the way of analogy 15 the one that has the most 
posltlve content It 1s not, of course, a literal or dlrect way of talking about God, and yet 
~t 1s a way that seems to glve us assurance that our talk is not just empty, and that ~t does 
somehow Imptnge upon God and give us some ~ n s ~ g h t  Into the mystery of Belng. Analogy 
makes posslble the language of scripture and 11turgy that is at the heart of the practlce 
of the Chr~stlan rellg~on. Is thls language really meaningful, or 15 ~t just, to put it bluntly, 
a klnd of mumbojumbo. . . . Unless we can say that it IS meaningful, I thlnk honest people 
would want to get rid of the whole business. Thls means that unless we can produce some 
reasonable account of the logic of analogy, there IS not support for our other ways of 
talk~ng about God, except the vra negatlva, and, taken In ~ s o l a t ~ o n ,  this leads stralght to 
a t h e ~ s n ~  11) 
Drawing from contemporary philosophical analysis, MacQuarrie argues 
thdt the very openness of language-its multi-valued character-seems to 
imply analogy. Only a widely ranging phenomenology which includes 
diverse symbols and meaning will save us from reductionism, he argues. 
MacQuarrie cites Newspeak, in George Orwell's 1984, as the antithesis of 
this claim: "the whole aim of Newspeak is to  narrow the range of thought." 
"Every concept that can ever be needed will be expressed by exactly one 
word, with its meaning rigidly defined and all its subsidiary meanings 
rubbed out and forgotten." MacQuarrie argues for a plurality of languages. 
Analogy is of basic importance in identifying appropriate symbols as myth 
is broken. In analogy, the conceptual dominates the emotional. Symbol alone 
runs the danger of becoming subjective and vague. Even as man's essence 
is expressed in his acts, so God's essence may be expressed and known 
analogically. The historical is joined to the transcendent in a metaphysical, 
ontological dimension. MacQuarrie understands analogy as joining the via 
negationis with the via eminentia. The former is an indispensable guard 
against the identification of God with any particular finite person or thing. 
To be sure, even in saying what deity is not, we are saying something about 
him. Yet if we are to be definite, the via enzinentia must be invoked as well. 
Analogical description moves from creation to God as well as from God to 
creation, both from the human situation and the object of religious affirm- 
ation. MacQuarrie's discussion re-opens but does not settle in detail the 
problems which have traditionally attended the exposition of the theme 
under discussion. 
3. The Thonzistic Pattern 
The Thomistic model, following Thomas Aquinas, has been causality, 
negation, and eminence." Thomism presupposes that the world must have 
a first cause. The Hebrew-Christian view of creation is joined with Aris- 
totle's doctrine of an unmoved mover and denial of infinite regress. God 
alone can be the final cause. Evidence of God's workmanship is seen in a 
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purposive, ordered universe. Man, in particular, bears the image of God. 
However, not just causality but negation and eminence are necessary to 
analogical predication. Negation is invoked, since we cannot speak of God 
directly in the same terms as  his creation. All limitations, in particular any 
simply anthropocentric or imperfect mode of existence, are denied radically. 
Eminence premises God as the fullness of being and reality. Goodness and 
truth exist perfectly in his reality. Employing both references, negation and 
eminence, a variety of attributes is ascribed to  deity analogically. 
It must be emphasized that analogy is not limited t o  Thomism. T o  be 
sure, philosophers and theologians in this tradition have treated the theme 
in great detail. However, Aquinas's synthesis has its background in the 
thought of earlier patristic and scholastic theologians. His interpretation 
cannot be separated from them completely either in content or  in method. 
Analogy premises that there is a logos, a n  abiding pattern of relations which 
yields authentic knowledge. T o  be sure, there was innovation in Aquinas's 
use of the AristoteIian world view. Equally important is the fact that he 
made a clearer distinction between philosophy and theology, natural and 
reveaIed knowledge, than most of his  predecessor^.'^ His anthropology, 
premising a harmony between nature and grace, was more optimistic than 
Augustine's. Yet the latter's "faith seeking understanding" was not aban- 
doned any more than the major tenets of his theology. In its classical form, 
analogy is not bound to a single school of philosophy. Although the theme 
is still used apologetically by some commentators, recent historical studies 
have made it possible to "unpack" the idea.13 It has been separated from 
Aquinas's intellectualism in other Roman Catholic formulation as well as 
Protestant interpretation. 
4. Modern Language Philosophy 
The variety of types and uses of analogy make it virtually inevitable that 
there should be widespread doubts about its legitimacy. Discussion of our 
theme in modern language philosophy has been carefully reviewed by 
Aahmes Ely Overton in "The Problem of Analogy in Theological Method."'" 
Overton's study is one of the most discerning recent considerations of 
analogy theory by a non-Roman Catholic interpreter. It has both range and 
incisiveness. At the same time that he understands the necessity of analogical 
description, he seeks to guard against the ambiguities of an omnibus refer- 
ence. He points out that some modern commentators seek to  limit analogy 
to the role of a linguistic guide, arguing that it can give no real information 
about God. C. 6. Prado in "A Note on Analogical Predication" holds that 
it can yield no authentic knowledge of God until his existence has been 
established independently by some other means. He  urges that any moral 
qualities attributed to God remain more equivocal than analogical until the 
staggering problem of natural evil is solved.ls Frederick Ferri. in his 
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Language, Logic and Godallows that analogy may serve to "limit the proper 
employment of language within the framework of systematic assumptions."16 
It is valuable as a linguistic guide if there is already a basis for a theological 
"universe of discourse" in doctrine, creed, and scripture. In such a context, 
analogy can describe "God's uniquely characteristic activity." However, 
Ferrk is skeptical concerning analogy's ability to give "information about 
real properties of supernatural beings" and in particular denies any onto- 
logical identity between God and man. 
Can religious language be given any public content or be tested empiri- 
cally? A. J. Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic was forthright in its denial 
of the validity of religious language.J7 Ayer applied the term "nonsensical" 
to theological discourse because he judged it to  be hopelessly encumbered 
with analogous terms which have no empirically testable referent. Religion 
may invoke emotive language as private poetry, but those who use it must 
not be so confused as to believe that there is cognitive import. It should be 
noted that Ayer himself abandoned the earlier forms of his verification 
principle. Professor John McIntyre has called for a "counter-offensive" to 
show how often "the analyst's use of language is itself'analogical," and to 
reveal how even the old positivist principIe of verification was based im- 
plicitly on "a completely analogical view of the nature of language."18 
Attempts have been made to appropriate the modern analytic tradition 
more positively. Wittgenstein's statement that words "are like arrows, 
deriving their meaning from the goals at which they are directed and from 
the purpose which they serve," is cited. In his Lectures and  Conversations, 
Wittgenstein comments that words "designate" by "shooting at something" 
and thus establishing a "projection connection."fg W. S. Taylor holds that 
Wittgenstein's category of "family resemblances" functions in the same way 
as Aquinas's analogy of attribution. In both, the diverse particulars of an 
entity are "related to each other in virtue of a family resemblance which is 
thought to owe little or nothing to identical elements."20 Instead, it is 
dependent on their common relation to something beyond themselves. 
5. Metaphysical Interprezations ofAnalogy 
Overton points out that a positive view of analogy belongs more charac- 
teristically to philosophers who accept the validity of metaphysics. Dorothy 
Emmet begins The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking with Emerson's 
comment: "Man is an analogist and studies relations in all objects."21 She 
argues that analogy, broadly conceived, is a necessary vehicle for acquiring 
knowledge about the relations which are found among things as well as 
within conceptual systems. It is presupposed in scientific induction as well 
as in the symbolic and mathematical references used in establishing a logical 
calculus or even probability theory. Overton identifies G. F. Woods as one 
of the most important recent commentators on analogy. Woods argues that 
ANALOGY AND T H E  KNOWLEDGE OF GOD 27 
it is prerequisite to all forms of explanation, practical everyday knowledge, 
and specialized theory." He urges that we constantly make inquiries and 
decisions "which depend upon nothing more than analogical knowledge. 
We should perish without it."*3 It is not possible t o  anticipate all novelty in 
an exhaustive theory of knowledge. Instead, we must classify observed data 
in terms of new knowledge which is "neither quite like nor quite unlike 
anything we have known before." In short, "we live and continue to live by 
going beyond the limits of our actual experience. . . , We are bound to 
venture by analogy beyond the frontiers of our immediate experience." 
However, Woods urges that we "should never adopt this indirect procedure, 
if we could avoid doing so. It is not a matter of choice but of necessity." 
Woods takes personal being as the key root metaphor or analogy of 
experience. All the rest of experience is to be explained from it. In some 
respects, he seems to be only reformulating the Thomistic analogy of being. 
However, as Overton points out, he substitutes a dynamic sense of person- 
hood for the notions of being and spirit utilized by the Thomists. Woods 
finds that all means of expIanation in history, science, and philosophy begin 
in the apprehension of personal being. Personal being is not a means of 
explanation which we establish ourselves. We do not choose personal being 
arbitrarily but discover its meaning. It is inevitable that we should think of 
other beings analogically in language which is taken "from our experience 
of our own being." The facts and the values of others are explained in terms 
"derived from our own experience of action and value." Analogy is necessary 
because we cannot understand anything which is completely and utterly 
unlike personal being. This is as much the case in science and history as it is 
in philosophy and theology, Woods argues that change in physics cannot be 
explained simply in terms of physical measurement. On the contrary, we 
must infer from knowledge of change in our personal being in order to 
understand what it means in a physical process. 
Woods concludes that if there were an ultimate explanation of the world, 
it would have to be analogical to our own personal being. He does not have 
in mind the use of analogy to indicate a logical ratio or mathematical pro- 
portion between relations of defined and exact quantity. He believes that 
such analysis usually deals with precise likenesses which were known even 
before they were related. Rather, he means that all explanation must be 
done by the method of analogy as we reason from what we know best to 
what we know less well. Woods does not seek to refute Hume directly, but 
holds that it is impossible to prove that the "first cause" or "ultimate being" 
is impersonal. In this view, analogy is not only the foundation for a hier- 
archy or a principle of relations between all other explanations; it makes 
evident how explanations in all fields are possible. 
Woods's analysis presupposes a kind of inclusive realism. How much is it 
an explication of theological premises and how much a philosophy of 
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religion'? The question is perennial in the consideration of our theme. Woods 
argues that an analogy of personal being may be extended in such a way 
that it will yield "ultimate" explanation-a ground for other explanations 
and a capstone of a hierarchy of interrelated explanations. As ground of 
the whole causal series a first cause must be unique. A11 temporal experience 
is transitory and contingent. We are compelled to believe in "ultimate being" 
because there is no temporal being which in itself gives a full explanation of 
how it came to be. Although there may be no logically necessary argument 
for a personal "ultimate being," nevertheless "there are considerations 
which make it reasonably probable to  believe that it is analogically like a 
personal being." 
6. Analogy and Isotnorphic Models (Ian Ranlsey) 
Overton also cites the reflection of Professor Ian Ramsey of Oxford 
University in his Models and Mystery. Ramsey makes more detailed refer- 
ence to modern scientific discovery than does Woods. Ramsey compares the 
function of isomorphic models in science with that of metaphor and analogy 
in theology.24 He urges that both types of reference lead to  discovery in 
their respective spheres, giving results that are not possible from other 
perspectives. Whatever justification can be offered for the employment of 
isomorphic models in scientific investigation has its parallel in the similar 
effectiveness of analogy in theology. Ramsey explains why an isomorphic 
or disclosure model is often more effective than a simply mechanical one. It 
is a type of reference which enables one to see a Gestalt in a previousIy 
meaningless constellation, thus providing "insight into mystery." The Gestalt 
may be as simple as the pattern observed in the formation of dots on a paper. 
Or  a formula may be used in such a way as to enable a chemist to see 
technical relations within the total structure of a family such as fatty acids. 
Ramsey does not look for parallels with natural science on the premise that 
it has a monopoly on the discovery of "truth." H e  believes the contrary. His 
claim is only that its methods and presuppositions have relevance for other 
areas of knowledge and life. Ramsey identifies a link between scientific and 
all personal insights in the human capacity for "intuition" which he defines 
as the capacity for receiving disclosures. 
Ramsey draws on the description and analysis developed by Max Black, 
arguing that scale models cannot play the exhaustive role that was earlier 
ascribed to them in physics, for example. Ramsey's theological interest is 
not shared by Black. Ramsey is careful to  disavow scholastic analogy theory, 
and his view is less precise and unified than traditional expositions of our 
theme. Yet he contributes to  its discussion by urging that modern science 
use isomorphic disclosure models as builders of discourse; they make it 
possible to develop theories as "large-scale interpretations" of phenomena. 
For example, a theory about refraction can be developed when phenomena 
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of light are treated by the isomorphic model of linear propagation. Similarly, 
metaphor and analogy function as builders of discourse in theology, facili- 
tating in the development of a "large-scale interpretation" of phenomena 
and religious experiences. 
Model and analogy offer a "map" which guides the theologian through 
experiential religious phenomena in part paralleling the way in which 
scientific theory "maps" a path through physical or  social data. Ramsey 
explains that theological disclosure (doctrine) is developed around a model 
(metaphor). Disclosure takes place with a tangential meeting of two diverse 
contexts. As the language of the second context filters into the language of 
the first context, there is disclosure and inroad into "mystery." Theological 
analogy is more than simile even as its counterpart, the isomorphic model, is 
more than mechanical scale model representation. The models of disclosure 
provide greater clarity and more precise identification of structural similar- 
ities. More than this, they also help to simplify phenomena and the network 
of theories which surround the explication, providing a map through the 
phenomenal forest of complex experiences and intricate doctrinal networks 
in religion. 
Ramsey's concept of authenticity and validation is broader than that of 
the logical analysts. Moreover, it carries an acknowledged ontological 
interest. Not only does Ramsey explain that models must "chime in" and 
"echo" structurally the phenomena they are investigating; "there must be 
something about the universe and man's experience in it" which matches 
the model. Ramsey urges that the universe itself authenticates a model. For 
example, there must be something about a wave that matches experience 
if it is to be used as an isomorphic model for light. Similarly, there must 
be a likeness between the divine and human Father, an analogy of father 
which matches a human father. Even while arguing that the universe itself 
authenticates the characteristic model in both areas, Ramsey acknowledges 
significant differences between scientific and religious models. He finds that 
the more useful and accurate a scientific model is "the more prolific it is in 
generating deductions which are then open to experimental verification and 
falsification." In theology, a model is not judged as better or worse by the 
number of verifiable deductions it generates. Rather, it is to be evaluated in 
terms of "its stability over the widest range" of religious phenomena as well 
as by its ability to incorporate and relate diverse types of such phenomena. 
In the end Ramsey, like Woods, invokes a human reference. He concludes 
that we cannot avoid distinguishing between the impersonal and the per- 
sonal. Theology investigates the latter and not simply natural phenomena. 
Ramsey is emphatic that human experience cannot be duplicated mechani- 
cally. He insists upon the metaphorical use of language in science as well as 
theology, even though it is often less apparent in the former. However, there 
is a significant difference. In natural science, the same word contains the 
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function of the qualifier and of the metaphor. This is not the case in theo- 
logical discourse; no model or analogy can occur without a quaIifier. The 
qualifier determines how the nature of the disclosure which is evoked by the 
metaphor will be developed. Most important, qualifiers declare the inade- 
quacy of all models to represent the structures and relations within religious 
experience.25 Ramsey uses this claim to reply to the agnosticism expressed 
in the often cited parable of Anthony Flew. Use of the term "Father" with 
respect to deity, Ramsey argues, gives "life by a thousand enrichments," not 
"death by a thousand qualifications" as Flew charged. 
Karl Barth's interpretation of God's power may be used to support 
Ramsey's claim. Barth has shown how God's power or omnipotence must be 
qualified by his Fatherhood in exposition of the Biblical material. Christian 
speech about evil, suffering, and the sin of the world is not independent of 
this reference. Analogy cannot be used responsibly unless it is qualified. For 
example, the parable of the prodigal son is not intended to show that God 
always acts as we would, but the opposite; context and qualifiers must be 
identified together. Ramsey urges that qualifiers dispel the notion that 
mystery is a religious experience which can be explained away, refuting the 
charge of nonsense. He emphasizes that modern science does not give an 
exhaustive description of reality. Even before one level of mystery is com- 
prehended fully, another appears. Scientific models can increase mystery. 
Ramsey concludes that it now has become doubly evident that an open and 
meaningful view of experience, imagination, and intuition, not just pure 
measurement, is necessary to explanation. Analogy is relevant in such a 
context. 
11. THEOLOGY OF ANALOGY 
1. The Przywara- Barth Debate 
The contemporary interest in analogy is not simply philosophical, but 
arose in the context of interconfessional discussion. The First Vatican 
Council emphasized that the existence of deity can be known with certainty 
apart from special revelation. Aquinas's distinction between the natural and 
revealed knowledge of God was part of the background of its pronounce- 
ments. Subsequent papal decrees directed that Thomism be made central in 
the curricula of Roman Cathoiic seminaries and universities.' Extensive 
research was undertaken in a variety of subjects related to analogy in the 
scholastic tradition. The analogy of being was expanded and developed as an 
apologetic reference during the modernist controversy in the early twentieth 
century. Paradoxically, Karl Barth's rejection of Protestant liberalism, 
following the first world war, with his accompanying reaffirmation of the 
Reformation, opened the way for Protestant discussion of analogy with 
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Roman Catholic theologians. The first premises of the Christian knowledge 
of God came under new scrutiny as the relation of nature and grace was 
debated in dialectical theology. Barth's complete rejection of the analogy of 
being led the way for discussion of the relation of faith and reason as well as 
e c c I e ~ i ~ l ~ g y  in terms of this idea. In the end, Barth developed his own partic- 
ular view of the analogy of faith, believing that it avoided the "idolatrous" 
consequences of the Roman Catholic synthesis of nature and grace. 
It was the criticism of the German Jesuit, Erich Przywara, which forced 
Barth into a defensive stance against the analogy of being. Przywara, more 
than any other person, was responsible for reformulating the doctrine of 
analogy and bringing it to Barth's attention. Barth's relations with this 
philosopher-theologian date from the time of his commentary on the Epistle 
to the Romans. In the preface of the fourth edition, he indicated that 
Przywara had been among the first persons who reaI1y understood his 
writing.' Przywara and Barth agreed that acceptance or rejection of the 
analogy of being is the dividing point between Roman Catholicism and 
Protestantism. An important personal debate between the two theologians 
took place at Munster in 1929 and treated the basic premises of ecclesiology 
as well as the natural knowledge of God. Of course, the legitimacy of a point 
of contact between man and God apart from faith has been argued in a 
variety of contexts, metaphysical and confessional. Przywara advocated a 
type of analogy which joins philosophy and theology in the spirit of Aquinas. 
In earlier periods, scripture and tradition, faith and works, the sacraments, 
the nature of authority and the Church have all served to delimit the differ- 
ences between the confessions. Analogy became a new reference point of 
division. Barth argued that no authentic knowledge of God remains after 
the fall. The image of God in man has been destroyed completely. Barth 
believed that the Roman Catholic attempt to speak of the natural knowledge 
of God from the analogy of being leads to a false religious alternative. 
2. Neo-Scholasric Interpretation 
Seen in its larger historical perspective, a debate which began in the 
intensity of interconfessional confrontation, in the end led to the positive 
clarification of theological ideas. In particular, it contributed to a renewed 
understanding of the crucial role of analogy in religious knowledge. Although 
Roman Catholic theologians differ in their descriptions of analogy, a com- 
mon obedience characterizes their reflection. Generally, it is formuIated in 
terms of a natural-supernatural scheme. As illustration, the dogmatics of 
F. Diekamp as revised by Jussen will be cited.Wiekamp-Jiissen describe 
analogy in terms of measured likeness, relative identity, and likeness and 
unlikeness, premising a likeness in relation to being as between God and 
creation. They hold explicitly to a doctrine of a twofold order of knowledge, 
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natural and revealed. The structure and content of theology are to be 
arranged accordingly. The revelation in Jesus Christ can be understood and 
expanded by the natural light of reason. An adequate terminology can be 
construed from a philosophy premised on natural theology. 
Diekamp-Jiissen describe man as characterized by intelligence and free 
will in the image of God; even after the fall, he is still able to  reach his natural 
goal in spite of sin. The Neo-scholastic concept of nature is many-sided. 
Nature is not just a physical thing, antithetical to spirit. Interpreted with the 
help of Aristotelian metaphysics, it includes substance, material or spiritual, 
and has natural potency and teleological direction. Diekamp-Jiissen take 
for granted that a term such as "life," taken from the contingent categorical 
realm, relates to the transcendentals: being, truth, good, and one. In 
describing analogy, they emphasize that God is free from every human 
limitation as purely spiritual, eternal, and necessary being. Theologically, a 
likeness of creation to deity is presupposed in spite of sin and indeed without 
reference to Christ's revelation. Knowledge of divine being comes by analogy 
from the world order even apart from faith. A causal image-archetype context 
is developed. The identity of essence and existence in God, joined with the 
cosmological argument, serves as the basis for analogy. Diekamp-Jiissen 
criticize the Protestant, Karl Barth, for his denial of the universal ability of 
human words and names to speak of deity. Barth's nominalistic position, it 
is alleged, leads to an arbitrary deity. 
3. Nature, Supernature, and Grace 
The fundamental Roman Catholic theological premise is that grace does 
not destroy but supports and perfects nature. Grace as participation in the 
life of God is the higher order. All of life is to be brought under its direction. 
It is not just moral change, but a new higher being with a supernatural goal. 
Protestants have conceived of the relation of nature and grace differently, in 
terms ofjustification by faith. Man's knowledge of God is radically corrupted 
by sin. Sin and not nature is the antithesis of grace. Revelation cannot be 
construed in terms of intellectual belief as subtraction and addition in a 
parallelism of nature and grace. There must be a more vital dialectic between 
faith and knowledge. Interconfessional discussion of analogy has turned on 
anthropology as  Roman Catholics and Protestants have debated their basic 
presuppositions concerning nature and grace. Kiihn in a carefully docu- 
mented study points out that a variety of options appears in Roman Catholic 
interpretation: nature beside grace, nature directed to grace in concrete 
unity with it, or nature redeemed through grace.4 Neo-scholastic school 
dogmatics has emphasized the first. It envisages two levels in the objective 
knowledge of God. The distinctions which it employs date not only from 
the high middle ages, but also from Baroque scholasticism. Although the 
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character of grace is more often debated in interconfessional discussion 
than the structures of nature, it is the role of the latter which requires careful 
in the study of analogy. 
Stanislas Breton in his Les Norns Divins et le problkme actuel de 
~'Hertneheutique, in a detailed exposition, attempts to relate Neo-scholastic 
analogy to the contemporary discussion of hermeneutic.5 It becomes mean- 
ingless to ascribeattributes to deity if one is only willing to  speak existentially, 
he argues. Breton uses analogy to criticize the demythologizing which he 
as also a desubstantializing. Rejecting substance for existence, 
Protestant dialectical theology defines God as the wholly other. Protestant 
existentialists speak of God in terms of "that" and "how" but not as "what." 
The "what" remains identified as the wholly other and is in fact understood 
from Heidegger's analysis of being. Analogy as a positive reference invokes 
the absolute. Negatively, God is known as one, simple, eternal, and immut- 
able. However, analogy is also used positively to designate life, intelligence, 
love, and wisdom. Goodness, truth, and being are premised together in the 
divine perfection. God's action, external to his being in creation, redemption, 
and sanctification, like the Holy Trinity, is described analogously. Of course, 
in speaking of the one good, eternal, all-powerful God who is ultimate, all 
determination is a limitation and in a sense dangerous. God in his aseity 
exists outside contingency. Yet the divine names bring purification and 
unification in describing a relation that is asymmetrical. God as spiritual 
substance is the absolute reality to which men bear living relation. A unity 
of opposites points to his reality which is yet above polarity. Negation and 
the absolute are joined analogously in the affirmation of his mystery. 
L. Malvez in his Transcendance de Dieu et Credtion des Valeurs develops 
the theme of analogy polemically against H. Dumery.Wumery, formerly a 
priest and now a professor of philosophy, has written extensively on the 
philosophy of religion. Critics such as MaIvez argue that he has moved 
outside of the limits of Catholic orthodoxy. Malvez urges that Catholicism 
premises rational argument, deduction, and even proof in rejection of a 
simply pragmatic approach to deity. Analogy is not just a rational exercise, 
but a way of relating to the fullness of being in participation and love. It 
makes possible knowledge of reality which exists in a different mode from 
our own, not by direct intuition but by concept. Malvez emphasizes that 
God is activity and existence, not just an object or idea; the Trinity is a 
dynamic and not simply a static concept. For analogical predication, God is 
not merely the pinnacle of the rational order of creation. Rather, as creator 
he is above all structures-One and absolute, the ultimate mystery. Episte- 
mologically, analogy implies a doctrine of the degrees of knowledge and 
being. Of course, the relation of the human to the divine is not to be conceived 
simply in terms of natural teleology. The key terms in analogical predication 
are spirit, value, and essence. God's initiative is supernatural and impinges 
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on the natural. Analogy makes explicit the ontological relation of creator- 
creation in a polarity of the one and the many. 
4. Bonhoeffer, Bultmann, and Gollwitzer 
Protestant treatment of the idea of analogy has been less carefully defined 
than the Roman Catholic. Dietrich Bonhoeffer's "Habilitationschrift," Act 
and Being, was written before he began teaching at the University of Berlin; 
it represents some of his most systematic reflection and antedates the Church 
struggle against the Nazis.7 Bonhoeffer praises the subtlety of Przywara's 
interpretation of analogy. He indicates that he shares at least part of the 
Jesuit's interest in epistemoIogica1 questions which are left undiscussed in 
Barth's "revelation positivism." Bonhoeffer's disagreements with both Barth 
and Bultmann are explicit. He attacks their premises as neo-Kantian and 
proposes a drastic epistemological reappraisal. As an alternative, Bonhoeffer 
mentions the analogia entis. In the end, Bonhoeffer agrees with Barth that 
this reference does not lead to  transcendence. He rejects Przywara's meta- 
physical interpretation for a more confessional, Christological stance. In 
fact, Przywara's view was much closer to Bonhoeffer's own theological 
premise than he realized. Przywara's interpretation of the analogy of being 
did not separate nature and grace as much as Bonhoeffer supposed and 
included as well an ecclesiology, It is the Incarnation, Bonhoeffer believes, 
which destroys the illusion that the Eternal can be encompassed in specula- 
tive ideas. Our knowledge of the self as well as deity remains confused apart 
from the insight given to the Church in this event. God's character as holy, 
righteous, and loving is not separable from these concrete determinations. 
Bultmann and his followers have raised the question of our knowledge of 
God with new radicalism. Bultmann more than Barth accepted philosophical 
categories-in part those of the early Heidegger. Protestant theologians in 
his school have moved away from substantialist, rationalistic interpretations 
to more existential, historical bases. Among contemporary Lutheran theo- 
logians, criticism of Bultmann's demythologizing has evoked fresh interest 
in analogy. In an essay which dates from 1935, "What sense is there in 
talking of God?" Bultmann commented: "God does not permit himself to be 
spoken of in general propositions, universal truths which are true without 
reference to the concrete existential situation of the one who is talking." In 
Jesus Christ and Mythology, Bultmann wrote: "The question of God and 
the question of myself are identical."g Does Bultmann's attempt to speak of 
God only as a determination of personal existence, together with the prohi- 
bition against making assertions about God himself, threaten to reduce 
deity to the states and changes of human existence? If we are to avoid all 
objective language, why should not God himself be demythologized? Buri 
charges that deity is only "a last remnant of illogically retained myth~logy."~ 
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Helmut Gollwitzer, who holds the chair of Protestant philosophy and 
theology at the Free University of Berlin, has emphasized the ambiguity of 
Bultmann's position: 
There is no doubt that Bultmann w~shes to speak but "of the l ~ v ~ n g  God in whose hands 
our time rests. . ." But hav~ng underlined t h ~ s  very point . . we must now go on to show 
the extent to which Bultmann adopts an lndecislve intermediary position whlch allows 
hlm ne~ther to speak plainly of God In his independent real~ty nor to regard talk of God 
as Improper.I0 
Bultmann himself expressed approval of analogy, although never giving his 
view about it in detail." Gollwitzer turns to analogy for knowledge of God, 
in an attempt to find a non-mythological way of speaking of God which is 
not simply existential-personal: 
The problem of analogy is one that Chr~stian theology a s a  k ~ n d  of th~nking that has to d o  
w ~ t h  su~table human ways of speaklng of God is essentially bound to face. Even when the 
answer glven to this problem by the doctrine of analogia enlis is rejected, that cannot mean 
the repudiat~on of analogical thinking of every kind. Christian talk of God has as such a n  
analogical structure-the decislve polnt is the closer def~nition of the concept of analogy, 
not the questlon of its appllcatlon or rejection.'? 
Gollwitzer wishes to reject the Roman CathoIic metaphysics of theism for 
a more dynamic, personal analogy in the tradition of Karl Barth. 
5. Traditional Analogy Doctrines 
The language of analogy was developed most carefully in scholastic and 
Counter Reformation Roman Catholic writings. Even thinkers who at- 
tempt to give the idea new expression cannot ignore its earlier forms entirely. 
For example, the distinction between attribution and proportionality dates 
from Cajetan.13 Thomas de Vio (1468-1534) formulated the dominant 
tradition of Thomistic interpretation in his On the Analogy of Names. The 
Counter Reformation Jesuit, Suarez, challenged Cajetan's categorization, 
favoring the analogy of attribution. The definition of its intrinsic, inner 
form as distinguished from its external form dates from his work. Suarez's 
followers argue that extrinsic attribution yields only a picture image or 
rhetorical figure; the same name is used with a fundamentally different 
realization. Intrinsic predication, however, indicates a real relation, desig- 
nating an attribute which is realized only imperfectly in the dependent 
member but perfectly in the principle: A and B are related to  C. As applied 
in the case of creator and creation, a relation of dependence is expressed 
through a common name. God is the primary analogatum. It must be em- 
phasized that Cajetan's strict followers deny the worth of both forms of 
attribution, extrinsic and intrinsic, and favor instead the analogy of proper 
proportionality: A:B=C:D. It is argued that this form of analogy alone pre- 
serves God's freedom, absoluteness, and aseity, while still allowing the 
creature his own relative autonomy.14 Advocates of this type of analogy 
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are careful to state that it does not bring deity into full comprehension or 
view in spite of its mathematical form. All persons are believed to have a 
relation to being which differs in mode. God's being is identical and neces- 
sary; that of the creature is not. Whereas improper proportionality is picture- 
like and uses metaphor, proper proportionality employs a similarity of 
relation rather than of likeness. Cajetan develops analogy as a concept in 
which God in his way and man in his are related in more or less essential, 
gradual differences. 
It is necessary to  distinguish between different school traditions in trying 
to understand the varied expositions of our theme. In contemporary rein- 
terpretation, expositors tend to choose their particular form of analogy in 
view of the focus and goal of their interests. The Jesuits, more than others, 
have followed Suarez,favoring the analogy of attribution. Chollet, Descoqs, 
Frick, Limbourg, Santeler, and van Steenberghen advocate this type. 
Blanche, Coreth, Fehr, Feuling, Leeuwen, Leist, Manser, Ries, Veauthier, 
Wagner, Woestyne, and Wyser speak for the analogy of proportionality.'5 
Not only are there wide differences in exposition among these interpreters, 
but the two forms of analogy are combined in a third school. The proponents 
of the so-called mixed group, claiming a complementary relation between 
the analogies of attribution and proportionality, are the smallest in number. 
A variety of rationales is offered. Brugger, for example, argues that the 
analogies of internal attribution and proper proportionality do not exclude 
each other, but are logically partial aspects of the same relation.16 Feckes 
agrees with Penido that the analogy of proportionality often virtually in- 
cludes an analogy of attribution. Santeler uses both types simultaneously.17 
In the mixed group, Lyttkens includes Maritain and R, P. PhiIlips.l8 Of 
course, there are critics such as Bange who demand a clearer distinction 
between the analogies of proportionality and attribution; others protest 
against the joining of the analogy of being and the analogy of faith.19 These 
two types of characterization, being and faith, which we will consider 
subsequently, are not competingforms with attribution and proportionality. 
Walker explains that they are not so much modalities as the expression of 
a particular understanding of the world, faith, and deity.20 
Metaphor, like the analogy of proper proportionality, has four terms. It 
is dynamic, but lacks the clear identifying definition in which every analogate 
is in a determined relation to  theproprium esse. The analogia entis describes 
the relation of God to his being and the world to  its being, as one of simi- 
larity and dissimilarity, likeness and differetlce. Similarity is in the relation 
to being, dissimilarity is its mode. Brugger emphasizes that analogical 
predication is not premised on a tertiurn commune between God and the 
creature." On the contrary, all creaturely modes of being have a common 
goal in God. Brugger regards the analogy of attribution as an essential 
enlargement of the analogy of proportionality. It is important to note that 
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who follow Aquinas most carefully vary in their defense of 
Hengstenberg, for example, argues that analogy is possible only 
after proof of God's existence. Feckes, on the other hand, concludes that 
analogy is necessary to it. Feuling urges that being is the proper object of 
knowledge of the human spirit. Because man is made in the image of God, 
an analogy of faith alone is not enough. God in man and man in God in 
truth and in grace, requires the analogy of being for explication. 
6. Contemporary Roman Catholic Interpretation: Manser, Platzeck, 
Hengstenberg 
It would be a mistake to suppose that Roman Catholic commentators 
have not attempted to make contact with modern epistemologies. On the 
contrary, the analogy of being has been used as an apologetic reference. 
Emerich Coreth, S.J., who teaches at the University of Innsbruck, develops 
his exposition on the premise that man and being are in specific relation 
with each other.23 He borrows from Heidegger, and a Bultmann-like 
Vorverstandnis of being is implied in his view. It surrounds and exceeds the 
inquiring person. Man stands in an open horizon, already knowing about 
it. Coreth warns against viewing the concept of being from simply a single 
dimension. The very fact that man can ask the question of being implies a 
relation between the questioner and what is asked. Coreth introduces the 
analogy of being in consideration of the polarity between "already" and 
"never." It indicates that man is in tension between immanence and trans- 
cendence. Analogy allows that beings remain what they are in the compre- 
hending unity of being. Plurality and univocity are together. However, 
analogy is first and univocity follows in abstraction. For Coreth, the concept 
of being is not derived from any other conceptual form; on the contrary, 
logic follows being. It is analogy which is the primary epistemological 
postulate as well as the presupposition of unity. Coreth argues that its basic 
metaphysical form is one between finite beings everywhere and infinite 
being. He distinguishes between the order of thought and the order of being- 
Whereas in the first analogy the relationship is primarily from below to 
above, in the second it is the reverse, from above to below. God as purely 
positive absolute cannot be reached directly and univocally. Yet analogy 
Ieaves open an unlimited possibility of ascent. There is a positive element 
even in negative affirmation as God is recognized to be mystery. 
Gallus M. Manser defends Aristotelian-Thomistic realism in the tradition 
of Cajetan.24 He favors the analogy of proportionality with bases in mathe- 
matics as well as metaphysics and attempts to give it precise epistemological 
definition. Manser remarks that the way in which the problems involved in 
the interpretation of analogy are resolved depends on the particular theory 
of knowledge employed. He rejects idealism, empiricism, and nominalism, 
alleging that all allow no real difference in things, as they deny the conceptus 
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objectivus of being. Being, in his view, is an inclusive reality which is in all 
as truth, unity, and goodness. Manser accepts Cajetan's description of 
analogy as relative identity in transcendental relation. Transcendental being 
is not a thing-in-itself, separated from the world ofvthings, but out of and in 
things. Manser gives priority to the thing itself, the ratio re, which he regards 
as the object of human knowledge. Known first, it is subsequently inter- 
preted. There is no direct knowledge of singulars as nominalism supposed, 
and Occam's rejection of analogy on this premise was unjustified. Manser 
acknowledges that univocity dominates in the categories: transcendentality 
is known only imperfectly in existence. However, it is in transcendental 
being that the locus of primary unity is found. Initially, concepts can come 
only from the categorical realm; it is analogy which gives them a transcen- 
dental meaning. Of course, we do not reach God's absolute wisdom. None- 
theless we may say that wisdom is intrinsic to both creator and creature. 
Analogical description is premised on the relative but essential difference 
that one is inferior to the other. 
The major voice raised against the Thomistic analogy of being in the 
medieval period came from the Franciscans; today, they continue to argue 
for Scotus's univocatio entis. Timotheus Barth, Pacificus Borgmann, and 
Novatus Pickard all write in the Scotist tradition. Pickard argues that 
transcendental concepts are univocal.25 Scholastic philosophy and theology 
were simply underdeveloped. They had not worked out the Greek concept 
of analogy sharply enough to distinguishuncertainty with proportionalitatis 
interna and externa. Borgmann argues that ontological and semantic- 
grammatical problems remain; the scholastic concept of being was not 
abstract enough and was loaded with hylomorphism. He finds chaos in 
concepts of univocation and analogy, and urges that clarification is necessary 
1. ontologically, 2. grammatically, and 3. logically. The debate between 
Thomists and Scotists concerns questions of order. For the latter, analogy 
is not first and basic but subsequent and derived. It is important to note that 
some contemporary Roman Catholic theologians regard the alternative of 
analogia entis or univocatio entis as less definitive and an academic question. 
For example, Michael Schmaus of the University of Munich claims that 
univocity rather than analogy was basic for Albertus Magnus and Aquinas 
in the categorical realm.26 
Rolf Walker's study of analogy as concept and method ranks among the 
most comprehensive by any Protestant to date. Walker concludes that the 
majority of commentators leave the logical element in analogy unanalyzed. 
The most notable exception, according to Walker, is the Franciscan, Erhard- 
Wolfram Platzeck.27 Platzeck argues that the idea of analogy has not been 
formulated adequately either in medieval or in modern logic. He speaks 
against a similarity of merely two relations in parallel, insisting on three 
proportions and six terms. Logically, the relation of finite "that" and "what" 
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to infinite essence must be expressed as not-not-existing and a not-Not- 
something. Platzeck argues that causality is not logically expressible. The 
fact is that we cannot come logically to  the second analogate as between 
total and partial cause. God's existence cannot be presumed to be known 
apart from his essence; one is as undefined as the other. Most traditional 
forms of analogy, Platzeck charges, develop Aristotelian causality on 
Neoplatonic premises. Platzeck attempts to clarify the existential moment 
in the God-man relation, in order to avoid this confusion. He agrees with 
Descoqs as against Penido that the analogy of attribution must be more 
than merely one of name. Platzeck's Von Analogie zum Syllogismus is a 
singular example of the type of research necessary to critical expIication of 
the idea of analogy; it is an examination of his subject in Socrates, Plato, 
and Aristotle. 
Hans-Eduard Hengstenberg, also a Roman Catholic, resolves epistemo- 
logical ambiguities which appear in the definition of analogy on theological 
premises.28 Hengstenberg's view is formulated in conscious criticism of Karl 
Barth's position, but is none the less influenced by it. Hengstenberg urges 
that the similarity between God and creation cannot be defined simply from 
Aristotelian metaphysical premises, but requires revelation. Aquinas was 
unable to offer any real content to  analogy on his premises. Natural theology, 
although showing that God exists, gives too little knowledge about him. It 
simply does not offer enough determination to illumine concrete existence. 
For example, love remains impersonal and universal. Theology joins 
philosophy in Hengstenberg's view under the priority of the Trinitarian 
concept of God. He describes analogy as an unfolding of knowledge which 
we already have of the creator, together with the grace which binds us to him. 
Revelation has the dominant role in Hengstenberg's analogia trinitatis. It has 
a characteristically double form, positive and negative, in his exposition. 
There is an incomplete similarity to the perfections of God in direct analogy 
of being, essence, and love. An ever greater dissimilarity points to the 
creature's limitations in time, space and matter. Hengstenberg's Trinitarian 
analogy is a dynamic which joins the acts of God and creation and illumines 
love in its inner fullness. Created esse and pure act of God meet, and deity is 
disclosed as the absolute meaning of existence. 
111. HISTORICAL SURVEY 
1. Pluto 
Przywara finds that Plato, more than any other thinker, laid the basis for 
later interpretations of analogy. Whitehead's comment that all subsequent 
philosophy has been a footnote on his ideas, could be applied to our theme.' 
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The method of analogy was used earlier in Greek religion and by poets and 
philosophers of nature. Eberhard Jiingel has shown that it was already 
present in the thought of Parmenides and Heraclitus.Vet it was Plato 
most of all who clarified and elevated its usage for both philosophy and 
religion. Przywara argues that his basic polarities of the one and the many, 
being and becoming, the eternal and temporal, all relate to it. 
Unlike Przywara, Thomists generally hold that onIy the analogical struc- 
ture of the notion of being, not the analogy of being itself, is to be found in 
Plato's works: the Sophist 15 is the closest he came to such a reference, 
which they find to be explicit in Aristotle.3 Pannenberg argues that all of 
Plato's analogies require at least a limited univocity of being. Whatever the 
differences with subsequent interpretation, it is clear that analogy had a 
central place in Plato's reflection as he attempted to deal with the problem 
of diversity of relationship. He believed that the unity of reaIity is such that 
the novel or unknown can be approached by negation. In effect, Plato used 
phiIosophica1 analogy as a resource for surpassing the particular and natural 
limits of individual human experience. He found a resemblance in spite of 
difference between objects given in our experience and others which escape 
it. Analogy is possible because this resemblance reduces to one of relations. 
Grenet has made a careful study of analogy in the Platonic dialogues. He 
concludes that three elements are necessary to a rigorously stated analogy: 
1. resemblance in the midst of dissemblance, 2. two terms from heterogeneous 
orders of reality or at least from two irreducible planes of knowledge, and 
3. resemblance of relations and not just a relation of resemblance, a likeness 
of relation or proportionality and not just of things.4 Lyttkens argues that 
Plato was the first philosopher to use analogy without any direct relation to 
mathematics.5 His research shows that Plato employed this concept in three 
or even four different ways. First, its original mathematical character is 
retained in some of Plato's exposition. For example, like mathematical 
relations are assumed to exist between cosmic elements. Secondly, Plato 
identifies analogous general relations between various kinds of knowledge 
and spheres of reality. Thirdly, he employs analogy to designate similarity 
in function between two things. Instead of expressing like relations between 
two couples, it indicates only similarity of function in two different entities. 
Finally, Plato applies analogy to logical definitions of certain concepts and 
their uses rather than to likeness or relations between different phenomena. 
In such a role, it is used to  indicate the nature of these concepts. 
Plato looked for universal relational concepts amid the manifold of 
particulars. Objects which share the same prototype have a common self- 
identical essence and logos. Platonic analogy distinguishes pattern and 
structure in a system of relations. Being rather than non-being, the im- 
manence and transcendence of truth is presupposed. However, meaning is 
not reduced to a single univocal pattern. Grenet describes Platonic analogy 
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as a way of expanding and extending knowledge which enables us to know 
the super-sensible even amid the limits of our situation in the world.6 Plato 
used notional synthesis for comparison of objects or groups of objects of 
radically distinct orders, for example, the sensible and intelligible. Grenet 
remarks that his discovery of analogy is epitomized in his belief that simi- 
larity of relations has an  incomparable power of synthesis.' In this context, 
analogy becomes a tool for representation of objects which are situated 
outside of human experience by mediation of conceptions taken from it. 
Earlier in religion, myth had been used for similarity of both persons and 
relations. Plato kept only the latter. 
Plato's intellectuaIism must be distinguished radically as an alternative 
to the popular analogies which depicted the divine from the world of men. 
He believed that the limits of man's being can be clearly identified in terms 
of corporeality. The Phaedo, Symposium, Republic, and Phaedrus give 
evidence of his conviction that the body is an obstacle to the fullness and 
purity of thought. The physical stands in the way of complete attention to 
intelligence. Moreover, the Platonic spiritualism is inevitably aristocratic. 
Philosophers have the ability to know both beauty and the forms. Vulgar 
men are not able to apprehend the divine. Homer as well as the divination 
of the poets had described the gods anthropomorphically, Popular religion 
tended to destroy the mystery of the sacred by substituting anthropomorphic 
analogy for the divine mystery. With different motivation, philosophers of 
nature applied analogy in more impersonal forms in search for the causes 
of phenomena. Anaxagoras, for example, mixed the mechanical analogy of 
water in rotation with the more philosophical analogy of intelligence. In his 
philosophy, Heraclitus drew on the notions of war and fire in his attempt to 
describe the universe. It was the genius of Plato's more profoundly meta- 
physical solution that it rejected an immanentistic pantheistic monism as 
well as the absolute transcendence of irrational mysticism. 
How much can Platonic analogy be claimed for later Christian theology? 
Grenet argues convincingly, citing particular passages, that Platonic analogy 
is qualitative and not simply quant i ta t i~e .~  Plato's dialectic is characterized 
by a profound sense of the purity of spiritual being, together with a logos 
and structures which can be known intellectually. Plato uses myth con- 
sciously for pedagogical purposes even as he rejects the anthropomorphic 
analogies common in Greek popular religion. His tale of the fashioning of 
the world by the Demiurge from a model reflects his underlying dualism as 
well as the fundamentally esthetic character of his analogy. This assuredly 
limits his usefulness for later Christian theology. Przywara speaks of an 
"undying struggle" between God and demons.9 BiblicaI voIuntarism and 
theodicy are not present. Yet claims are made for a just providence in the 
dialogues. Calhoun emphasizes that Plato did not regard the Good as 
ineffable in the later Neoplatonic sense. 
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Calhoun argues that Plato constructs an analogical notion of a universal 
intelligent cause through the accumulation of empirical notions.10 Using an 
exterior analogy, he speaks of a "divine engineer"; "chief," "guide," and 
"father" are used more personally, Construction of an analogical notion of 
intellect is based on a metaphysical hypothesis. The Good is identified with 
intelligence and intelligence with cause; anthropomorphism is rejected. 
Plato often substitutes a more familiar image for a less known object. The 
limitations of our knowledge are evident in the fact that even the soul itself 
can be known only by substituting a sensible image. Physical objects cannot 
be grasped because of their mobility and require such an image. However, 
with respect to the divine, one cannot substitute an image but must speak 
analogically. An analogical notion is substituted for the pure form in de- 
scribing deity. Negation is used in rejection of anthropomorphism. Platonic 
analogy presupposes a positive reference. God as essentially good is not the 
cause of evil nor is he susceptible to imperfections or change. 
Grenet acknowledges that analogy is increasingly mathematized in PIato's 
later works." For example, the soul of the world is given a mathematical 
structure. Against this orientation, he notes the importance of artistic 
imitation. Mathematics itself may reflect harmonies. We should not identify 
beauty in itself with its exemplifications, but instead must have recourse to 
analogy in its description. For Plato, religious, moral, and artistic activity 
stand together. Religion is imitation of the divine. Through analogy, an 
object essentially different from that given in human experience becomes 
none the less knowable.'? Lyttkens calls attention to the indefiniteness of 
Platonic analogy. Plato, although establishing analogous relations in the 
hierarchy of being, gives no direct account of their similarity. Of course, a 
partial explanation is to be found in the correspondence between the degree 
of truth or reality of an object with the degree of its clearness in the subject. 
Analogy does not presuppose that all terms have a common property, e.g., 
reality or truth, but only that the degree of such a property is comparable. 
Cosmological references to the concept of analogy appear primarily in 
the Republic together with the Timaeus.13 Plato describes it as a unity- 
creating bond that makes the world symmetrical, harmonious, and in accord 
with itself. He invokes geometrical analogy to establish a series of mutually 
corresponding proportions. A fixed numerical relation establishes the 
qualities of each element and their intensities together with that of contrary 
qualities. It is in this way that Plato attempts to correlate the two funda- 
mental elements, earth and fire, by means of a third which serves as a link 
between them. The indefiniteness of his analogy is evident, inasmuch as he 
does not state specifically how we are to conceive the mathematical relations 
for which these four elements are terms. Rather, he tells us only that the 
Demiurge joins them in such a way as to form an analogy. Of course, the 
basic conviction is clear: the intrinsic agreement of the world is one of 
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analogy and symmetry. Plato believed that the harmony in the universe 
depends on these different elements being connected in such an agreement. 
Analogy as used in this context is not mathematically exact, because the 
activities of the Demiurge are restricted by necessity. Lyttkens finds that 
plato shifts from saying that certain things belong to  an analogy through 
similarity of relations to a qualitative similarity signifying a given structure 
or function of a thing.14 
For Plato, knowledge built on the visible world will always be inadequate. 
True knowledge comes from true reality, which is found in the world of 
ideas. His epistemology identifies similar interrelations of things and 
"typologizes" particular concepts and their uses. AnaIogy is a mean which 
bears a relation to, but is not identical with, truth. Plato emphasizes that the 
nature of our concepts depends on the objects they represent, He is explicit 
that human nature itself prevents us from possessing divine truth fully. He 
suggests further that we must necessarily use temporal categories in speaking 
of God, although only an eternal present can be applied properly to deity. 
2. Aristotle 
Although Aristotle did not use the phrase "analogy of being," it is often 
claimed as a constituent category of his philosophy. Clearly, his primary 
~nterest was logical, ethical, and metaphysical rather than religious.15 
Christian theological significance became attached to his interpretation in 
Aquinas's effort to relate faith and reason positively. Allowing the largest, 
most ample differentiation, and premised on likeness rather than identity, 
Aristotelian analogy was transferred t o  the Christian deity. Aristotle, like 
Plato, used analogy to link different fields of knowledge and to express 
interrelationships, Lyttkens has studied the place of AristoteIian formulation 
in Thomism in detail. He holds that Aristotelian analogy originally had a 
mathematical source, citing the definition in Nicornachean Ethics 1131a, 
31f, which describes the equality of two proportions, that is, a proportion- 
ality.16 Platzeck, a Franciscan, has attempted t o  demonstrate how Aristotle 
gave analogy a more definite logical form than Plato.17 Puntel questions 
whether such a conclusion, even if established, solves the problem of 
analogical predication.18 Plato had linked the sensible world to  the realm of 
ideas by a proportion, and the image-prototype relation was primary in his 
view. As a biologist, Aristotle proceeded from concrete things, attempting 
to determine whether or not they have the same properties. His analogy is 
more multivocal. He employed this reference to  classify likeness between 
different genera; analogy identifies similarity of function even in very 
different entities. 
The Nicon7achean Ethics is cited as evidence for the claim that Aristotle 
understood being as an analogical concept. He uses analogy to compare 
two or more qualities in ethics. Virtue is described as the capacity to be in 
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between. Analogy as applied to ethics is a middle or mean which enables 
us to view qualities in harmonious or disharmonious relation. In all the 
unidentical relationships of friendship, for example, it is analogy which 
expresses unity in difference and difference in unity. Good is not merely a 
homonym or synonym; it has no univocal universal concept in a11 categories. 
However, Aristotle does not make the threefold distinction between uni- 
vocal, equivocal, and analogical. His classification is only a double one. 
All things are synonymous with a common name and logos, or simply 
homonymous withjust a name in common. Aristotle has not decided whether 
relational statements belong to homonym or synonym. Pannenberg empha- 
sizes that homonym is not metaphorical analogy; the image-copy reference 
is avoided.19 For Aristotle, metaphysical analogy is at most a border 
possibility. His orientation of all being on substance was expanded in the 
Neoplatonic cosmos, as it was used to describe what is common to the 
known and the unknown. 
In his Metaphysics, Aristotle uses analogy to denote qualitative likeness 
of structure. He proceeds on the assumption that a concept may be trans- 
ferred from one thing to another by reason of general correspondence or 
similarity. Lyttkens finds that it is difficult to decide what analogy really 
signifies as a means of describing metaphysical structure; it is only a general 
likeness.'O To be sure, Aristotle tries to be more specific. Book V of the 
Philosophical Dictionary describes analogy as likeness of relations without 
designating any particular kind of similarity. Aristotle distinguishes four 
kinds of unity: numerical, specific, generic, and analogous. In each case, the 
wider unity comprises the narrower; thus analogy comprises the generic but 
the generic does not constitute the analogous. In the twelfth book of the 
Metaphysics, Aristotle explains that the four causes and three fundamental 
metaphysical principles (form, privation, and matter) are analogously 
common to all things. Two other principles, actuality and potentiality, are 
analogously the same. However, they not onIy vary in diverse entities but 
also apply to things in a different way. 
Pannenberg warns that Aristotle's first principles are not univocal con- 
cepts from which the manifold can be abstracted." No universal synonym 
is affirmed for being. Concepts, although multivocal, treat properties with 
corresponding functions. Analogy becomes a kind of comprehensive category 
used to identify connections between things whose qualities cannot be 
compared directly; it is applied to a plurality of things which are believed to 
have a corresponding function, and allows for gradations and tensions in 
being in a variety of perspectives. Lyttkens finds that Aristotle transfers 
analogy from the likeness of proportions of two couples to likeness of 
function of two properties.22 But functions are not independent of pro- 
portional terms as in mathematics. Whereas the mathematical analogy 
states the actual likeness of relations univocally, form and matter are con- 
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cepts which are applied to  a multitude of different things. Lyttkens protests 
that analogy is used to  join different categories without consideration of 
what constitutes the likeness of relations. Puntel finds that unity and differ- 
ence and the eventfulness of being are not clarified. These limitations, 
Puntel believes, are carried over into later analogy doctrine in a Christian 
context. 
The Thomistic appropriation of Aristotelian philosophy in the formula- 
tion of a metaphysics of analogy remains of continuing importance. Aalders 
has attempted to summarize the contribution of Aristotle for later doctrines 
of the analogy of being. He emphasizes chat being for Aristotle is not a 
minimum but a maximum; it is not an abstraction but a reality." In Aris- 
totle's view, the world is characterized by endless differentiation as well as 
synthesis. Attempting to place everything in relation, he avoids strong 
identity as well as sharp antithesis. He believes that the higher does not 
exclude but includes both the genera1 and lower. The distinction between 
potential-actual affords a logical basis for many different levels and nuances 
of reality in life as well as thought. Connection and relation have a primary 
place in Aristotle's understanding of the world. Analogy is relevant in a 
view which claims that thinking and what is thought have a unity but not 
identity. Even as we make distinctions in consciousness, we remain related 
to essential being. Reality is not deduced from anything, but is always 
present in some concrete way. Aristotle's metaphysics finds a logical place 
for everything in the cosmic rhythm of being and becoming. Being as  im- 
manent unites all categories, matter and form, potentiality and actuality. 
It shows itself in experience. However, it is not self-complete in the world. 
Beyond all temporal, finite reality is the unmoved, unchanging eternal being, 
actuality without potentiality and form without matter. Even as it causes 
everything else, it remains unchanged in itself. Everything outside of it is 
moved by it, follows it, and participates in it. 
The difference between the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic ethos is evident. 
Plotinus rejected Aristotle's theory of the categories. He remarked that if 
anything at all from sensible substance applies to the spiritual, it is only 
because of homonym, that is, a common name. Neoplatonic belief was that 
the whole universe emanates from a single principle. It viewed the cosmos 
as a hierarchy of both vertical and horizontal series. Vertically, everything 
has its source in the One. Horizontally, a first monad on each level is the 
cause of all that exists. Pannenberg has pointed out the obvious dangers in 
such an approach: pantheism on the one hand or a harmless transcendent 
on the other.~"nowledge of God all too easily disappears in a dialectic of 
negative theology. Plotinus described God as the One beyond all form o r  
idea and transcending the antithesis between subject and object." All 
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concrete relations were subsumed under more universal ones in an analogy 
of only two members in different grades of being. Things were no longer 
believed to participate in ideas in the earlier sense of Plato. Plotinus held 
that the soul sees the intelligible intuitively and need not travel the long way 
round of the senses. 
Analogy can proceed from above downward, making transfers from the 
intelligible to the sensible world. Plotinus's view is distinguished from 
earlier philosophy by its radical emphasis on mystical seeking; such seeking 
is the knowledge of the highest Good. A common logos with the spiritual 
world can never be expressed adequately, as God transcends a11 logical 
priority. Although the soul is in contact with the intelligible, the unfathom- 
able One remains above both the self and conceptual knowledge. Neopla- 
tonism conceived of effects as remaining in as well as emanating from 
and reverting to their cause. What the one has primarily the other has 
secondarily. This is possible because the difference between them is primarily 
in intensity rather than degree. There is continuity from higher to lower. 
Prototype is related to image, ideas to things, in effective causality. In 
general, likeness is understood to mean that the effect as the secondary 
member has something which corresponds to the primary one, the cause. 
The same characteristic, although differently realized, is common to different 
spheres of reality. It is important to note that later Neoplatonists debated 
whether knowledge of God is equivocal or analogical, and the majority 
favored the former. 
The Neoplatonic heritage was mediated through Pseudo-Dionysius the 
Areopagite. His writings were accepted as from the apostolic age, and he 
was identified with the disciple of Paul described in Acts 17:34. Three 
constituents of analogy doctrine can be identified in his i n t e rp re t a t i~n .~~  
1. As in the Timaeus, elements of things are ordered in proportional relation. 
2. A mathematical theme is present in terms of a proportional, distributive 
justice. God gives rank to each thing analogously. The highest Good lights 
nature. Whether we are near or far, its light draws us to it in knowledge. 
lllumination is espoused but does not bring one immediately to God. 3. 
Analogical reiations are beginning points for the divine knowledge. Effects 
help us to see God the cause who is finally nameless. Pseudo-Dionysius 
does not identify any constant, abiding structure or limits as in Plato. He 
quotes Plato's statement that God has created all things because of his 
goodness. As God wishes to  draw them into community with himself, he 
has appointed for each according to its own analogy. The divine justice 
orders individual things in their appointed numbers and preserves the 
analogy of each. Analogy denotes a thing's grade in the hierarchy. 
4. Augustine 
Is the analogia entis to be found in Augustine? Lyttkens reports that he 
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knew the analogy of proportionality, but did not employ it e~tensively.'~ 
commenting on Cicero's version of Stoic analogy, Augustine argued that 
there is no ratio comparationis between God and the creature. Yet this is 
not all that he had to say about the problem of analogy. Augustine's con- 
version was inspired by the reading of Pauline texts from the New Testament 
together with later Neoplatonic philosophy. His interpretation joined these 
two references, Pauline and Platonic. He affirmed that all things exist from 
and receive their individuality by participation in the divine ideas. The 
mark of the divine workmanship is evident in the truth and beauty of the 
world. Early in his career as a Christian, under Neoplatonic influence, he 
premised a hierarchy of being based on differing participation in esse. 
However, unlike Neoplatonism, Augustine's approach to God was not 
simply negative. We speaks more positively, often in Biblical terms. The 
truth of all things is dependent on a likeness to Christ who is the truth. The 
Son is the absolute and perfect likeness of the Father. 
Przywara argues that the analogy of being was already implicit in earlier 
patristic thought. It came to its fullness in one major form-personal rather 
than cosmological-in Augustine's writing.28 The Augustinian way finds 
the presence of God within the human person as it reflects on the soul's 
ascent to its source and end. To  be sure, analogy is not simply internal- 
personal in a subjective sense. All creatures have their origin in God, but 
exemplify only imperfectly in their contingency the being which deity 
possesses in fullness. Augustine viewed God as  absolutely simple; creation 
in its different grades reflects his authorship. Although of different nature, 
the divine and the human are related analogically, Augustine's strategy is 
first to take away everything changeable and imperfect from human concepts 
in a via eminentia and then to conceive of the divine attributes more 
perfectly. Everything belonging to the sensible world must be removed 
from God, as he is purely spiritual. Although a trace of the Trinity may be 
seen in material things, it is man alone who bears the image of God. The 
soul-memory, intellect and will-reflects the divine pattern. It is when the 
soul turns away from the external, sensible world and contemplates itself 
that it moves toward the knowledge of God. All of God's attributes are 
identical, the same as God himself and his esse, I t  is the contingency 
characteristic of creation which makes our knowledge less than a unity. 
Yet seen in a larger context, it may be a step on the way to God. 
The Augustinian approach is illuministic in both its epistemology and 
its metaphysics. Analogy in such an outlook is not primarily cosmological 
or based on abstraction as in Thornistic formulation. Does it then yield 
knowledge at all? Faith seeking understanding is premised from the outset. 
Interpreters such as Pr~ywara find the analogy of being implicit throughout 
Augustine's writings, in the polarities of finite-infinite, temporal-eternal, 
relative-absolute. J. V. Langmead Casserley in The Christian in Philosophy 
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argues that it is not an analogy from the world-cosmological-but a m 
personal one-from the self t o  God-which has been determinative 
Christian theistic interpretati~n. '~ Augustine and not Aquinas was t 
chief architect of the Catholic synthesis. Turning inward, Augustine fou 
the presence of the absolute in the soul in a relationship which was experl 
enced before it was ever described analogically. 
Casserley urges that earlier Greek philosophies left no place for the 
concrete individual. The major classical philosophers moved from the 
universal to  the particular and from the particular to  the universal. Aug 
tine's Christian Platonism embodied a radical innovation. His voluntari 
allowed a more thoroughgoing personal identity and sense of the singula 
as well as of history. It is important to  note that the main traditions of 
classical Greek philosophy d o  not separate object and idea in the sense of 
nominalism. Being is known from three sources: the external world, God, 
and the self. Casserley emphasizes that it is the latter two which have 
priority in Plato and Augustine. Because there is not identity between God 
and the soul, a n  analogy reference becomes necessary and relevant. Augus- 
tinian analogy is a "knowing in a greater not-knowing," as  concept opens 
"over-out" to mystery.30 The Augustinian tradition continued in Anselm 
and Bonaventura, Descartes and Hegel, giving priority to  the structures of 
the self and its mode of knowledge more than to  the external world. 
Casserley interprets  the ontological a rgument  as characterist ically 
Platonic-Augustinian rather than Aristotelian-Thomistic. He describes its 
classical Christian form in Anselm as a n  affirmation of the unique singularity 
of being. Anselm no more than Augustine attempted to produce experience 
from thought, but to  know the self, Casserley argues that analogy alone can 
express the concrete particularity of historical experience. Anselm concluded 
that all rational men must believe in God because he is in fact present in 
inward experience in a unique singularity which can be expressed only 
analogically. Anselm attempted to demonstrate that we know God even in 
advance of concept. Essence does not presuppose existence except in this one 
case. God is both immanent and transcendent. Thomists have urged that 
Augustinianism perennially mixes philosophy and religious experience in a 
way which makes argument unclear. Casserley finds that their nature- 
supernature distinction does not make d e a r  how faith and reason are in 
perennial dialectic. He conceives of the cosmological argument as an ex- 
pression of faith seeking understanding and not in itself conclusive. 
Both Casserley and Przywara urge that Augustine's anthropoIogy is of 
decisive importance for his doctrine of analogy. Writing in the concluding 
chapters of his Confessions, Augustine describes time as measured in the 
soul. He points out that our consciousness moves between past and future 
in a specious present. The present leaves us as soon as we recognize it. The 
notes of a piece of music are related in memory, fading away even a s  we hear 
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their sound. God by contrast unites past, present, and future as in a timeless 
moment. For us, self-knowledge does not stand alone in its finitude, but is 
related analogically to  deity. The soul seeks certainty but doubt continues. 
What cannot be doubted, Augustine asks; and replies, one's own act of 
doubting and the self which doubts. Even in its finitude, created being bears 
the marks of a reality which transcends it and is inexplicable apart from the 
absolute. Casserley urges that Augustinian analogy is joined to a sense of 
singularity and history. In revelation, an analogy relation between God and 
the world is made known in event. The Biblical view is dramatic and personal. 
Analogy does not make experience; it discovers rather than invents the 
eventfulness of history. Przywara's way of stating the matter is to  say that 
Augustine joined existential emphases to  a doctrine of structure and essence. 
In contemporary terms, the analogy of being and the analogy of faith may 
be said to be interrelated in his view. 
5. Alexander of'Hales and Bonaventura 
There is a lack of continuity of development between the earlier Neo- 
platonic and later scholastic concepts of analogy.31 The beginning of the 
scholastic distinction between equivocal and univocal is found in Boethius. 
His commentaries on Porphyry and Aristotle utilize this distinction. In his 
writings, however, analogy is not yet identified as a middle or mean between 
the two extremes of univocation and equivocation; it remains a particular 
kind of equivocation. It was Alexander of Hales, drawing on  Averroes, who 
explicitly defined analogy as a mean between univocation and equivocation 
and brought the so-called middle view into favor.3' Alexander joined the 
Neoplatonic causal scheme with the ideas of this Jewish philosopher, utilizing 
insights found in Pseudo-Dionysius and John of Damascus. Pannenberg 
notes that the analogy of proportionality is not present in his thought. 
Instead, Alexander applied substance and accident categories to  the creator- 
creation relation and interpreted essence and existence as a single unity in 
 GO^.^' 
It is the Neoplatonic illuministic metaphysic along with causality, however, 
which made possible description of an analogical relation between God and 
creation.34 In high scholasticism, the Neoplatonic approach is developed 
most fully in the image-prototype pattern of Bonaventura. Analogy is 
interpreted in terms of illumination. The image of God in creation has 
different grades, reflecting the Trinitarian deity as creator, reconciler, and 
redeemer. Bonaventura, like Alexander a Franciscan, premises a similarity 
of form in qualitative relations. There is not a n  identity of nature, but only 
an order and proportion of relations. In such a context, the knowledge of 
Cod is not immediate but only from his effects. There is no participation in 
the divine essence. Nonetheless, the divine light changes the human spirit. 
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The knowledge of God which comes with the divine help is only one part of 
the process of imitatio as confirmatio. 
6. Aquinas 
Aquinas does not speak directly of an analogy of being. Nonetheless, it 
seems fair to say that the phrase expresses his fundamental outlook con- 
cerning the relation of God and man. He bases analogy on a theological 
premise, even as he deveIops it both philosophically and theologically. 
Analogia entis becomes analogia scientiae in his usage. Aquinas begins from 
being as an evident and simple first principle. It is always subject and never 
predicate; we think about it without creating it. All principles are based upon 
it and it excludes non-being. To be sure, being has many different forms. 
Aristotle has shown how many-sided it is. Created beings are not absolute, 
but limited and temporal in accordance with the capacity of their natures as 
received from God. The divine being is immaterial, imperishable, and eternal. 
Only God exists in himself; everything else has its existence from him. The 
source of being is not to be found in any species or genus. God is ens 
simpliciter as well as ens maximum. 
Aquinas's formulation premises a careful methodological balance. In the 
order of being, priority is with deity. The world is designated from God and 
derives its conceptual significance from him. However, in the order of 
knowledge, we must proceed from the world to  God. Likeness is always on 
the side of creation. Our knowledge requires a concept taken from the world. 
Through analogy, Aquinas attempts to formulate a perspective which makes 
God accessible to our human conceptuality as well as divisible into different 
properties. Such division is only from our point of view, inasmuch as God 
is absolute unity. In order to express a divine property in a human manner, 
Aquinas employs names from which an abstraction is possible. Lyttkens 
remarks that the more indefinite the concept, the easier its transfer to  
Presupposing the causal bond, Aquinas turns to  an absolutely indefinite and 
undefined esse, disregarding mode. He premises analogy on the claim that 
God and creation both have the property of esse; both exist. 
Aquinas believes that knowledge of God is possible because the world is 
an effect which resembles its creator. Causality is the premise of his negative 
as well as his positive theology. He speaks of a three-fold way to God, using 
a distinction of Pseudo-Dionysius: causality, via negativa, and via eminentia. 
If they are regarded from the point of view of what has been received, all the 
perfections of creation may be ascribed to God as effects. However, he is far 
above any of these; the characteristics ascribed to him must be understood 
to exist in a higher and more perfect way. Negatively, we know God as the 
first cause, immovable prime mover, and highest being. Positively, we may 
speak of him throughthe causal analogy or by deduction from some property 
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which is known from the proofs of his existence. It is the causal analogy 
which enables us to understand how varied names can be applied to God 
without contradicting his unity. Both the positive and negative are used 
together in analogy. The first is relevant as effects are understood to imitate 
the divine essence in different ways. The second is necessary as  one considers 
the limits under which they are invoked and understood. 
Attention to the idea of Iikeness between God as cause and creation as his 
effect belongs in particular to Neoplatonism.36 Lyttkens points out that 
Aristotle does not use the idea of likeness between cause and effect to 
describe the relation between God and the world.37 He acknowledges that 
Aristotle does argue that the cause of an effect transfers a form of the same 
type as its own. However, he concludes that three important Neoplatonic 
claims underlie Aquinas's interpretation. First, that unity precedes the 
manifold. The higher in the hierarchical scale, the greater is the unity. At the 
same rime, the higher comprises all that is subordinate and more divided. 
With respect to  deity, this means that God in himself comprises all of his 
effects while creation constitutes a dwindling scale of likeness to him. Second, 
Aquinas adopted the Neoplatonic claim that a cause is superior to  its effect. 
Equivocal are distinguished from univocal causes in that a property in the 
effect exists in the cause in a more perfect way. Third, Aquinas accepted that 
the effect exists in the cause in the mode of the effect. This premise allows for 
a difference in likeness and unlikeness between God and creation. Aquinas 
associated likeness between God and the world primarily with a likeness of 
form. He speaks of effects as pre-existing intellectually in the divine essence. 
The Neoplatonic mode is developed by direct analogies taken from Aristotle. 
It is important to note that Aquinas does not teach that God and creation 
have a common being through which they are interrelated. There are not 
three references, God, creation, and the being common to both. Aquinas 
speaks only of God with his being, and creation which receives its own 
particular nature and existence from him. There is ultimately only one last 
reality, namely, God. God's being alone is self-existent. Yet Aquinas's 
interpretation does leave a place for a variety of different forms and grada- 
tions of being in the world. The connection between object and thought, 
fully perfect in God, is present gradationally throughout all creation. Thought 
and existence in space-time are not opposed to being; rather, various forms 
of being are constituted as differentiated steps toward God. Although an 
indefinite number of predicates may attach to it, its value and reality are 
never empty or undetermined. All being has its source and ground in God 
and is per se good. There is truth in all things because of their relation to the 
highest truth of the divine mind. Esse is based phenomenoIogically and 
metaphysically as well as religiously. 
A number of careful post-war studies have provided a new critical, com- 
prehensive interpretation of Aquinask interpretation of esse. The distinction 
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between esserztia and esse is indispensable to  Aquinas's analogy doctrine. 
They are united only in deity, a s  God and his being are the same. Essenria 
and esse are interrelated but not identica1 in a wide variety of relations in the 
world. Essentia is possibility, the form which gives esse reality in the material. 
Esse, conceived and known in essentia, is self-evident but complex. Does 
their polarity denote a "real" difference, Puntel asks??s Esse exists primarily 
in God and only secondarily in the creature. Yet if one does not know God's 
esse directly, how is understanding possible? Puntel argues that the onto- 
logical difference is defined as it were "from above," primarily in terms of 
God's being rather than that of the creature. He charges that the divine 
perfection, although described substantially, remains undetermined historic- 
ally. There is formal identity but no real difference in distinguishing between 
righteousness, wisdom, truth, and goodness in God. Analogy is based on the 
concept of esse, but this concept is never clearly defined, particularly a t  the 
point of difference between man and God. In fact, Puntel concludes, such a 
model never really "enables" the deity to get "outside" of himself in real 
historical relation to the world. 
Aquinas presupposes that things are made like God insofar as they exist. 
Analogy makes it possible to speak together of God and the creation. 
Limitation is imposed in the sense that correlation between God and creation 
is unilateral. Aquinas is careful to  speak of gradations only in relation to 
each other and not to  deity. God, the first and general principle of all being, 
is beyond completion, the measure of all measures as well as being in itself. 
Creation resembles God but God does not resemble it. From the divine point 
of view, according to  Aquinas, all of God's properties could be designated 
by a single name. The divine unity is without any division into different 
properties such as goodness or truth. However, we are unable to  designate 
God except from his several effects. Thus there is plurality from below, as it 
were. Various analogous concepts must be used, inasmuch as the essence 
of God cannot be expressed by one concept. 
7. Tlzomistic Schools 
Cardinal Cajetan's systematic interpretation of Thomistic analogy has 
been definitive for the dominant tradition. He composed his De Non~inum 
Analogia when only thirty years old, a t  the beginning of a distinguished 
career. John of St. Thomas wrote: "the difficulties concerning analogy 
which are more metaphysical, have been argued so thoroughIy and subtly by 
Cajetan in the opusculum On the Analogy ofNanzes that no room is left to 
find out anything further."39 Cajetan's systematic explanation of Thomistic 
analogy in terms of fundamental principles follows a careful logical sequence. 
He identifies three fundamental modes of analogy: inequality, attribution, 
and proportionality. He believes that they correspond with those described 
by Aquinas in the Sentences as  according to being but not according t o  
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intention (inequality), according to intention but not according to  being 
(attribution), and according to both intention and being (proportionality). 
Cajetan's analogy of inequality was illustrated by the term "body." Its 
is not realized according to  an  equal grade, but as inferior or 
superior according to analogy. Yet it remains the same for all bodies. "The 
logician refers to analogous terms of this type as univocal. The philosopher, 
on the other hand, regards them as equivocal, the difference coming from the 
fact that the former considers the intentions expressed by the names and the 
latter their natures.-'-'O 
Of his second major type, Cajetan wrote, "Analogous by attribution are 
those things which have a common name, and the notion signified by this 
name is the same with respect t o  the terms but different as regards the 
relationships to  this term,"4' Cajetan uses as example predication of the 
term "healthy." It is applied to animal as the subject, urine as a sign of 
health, and medicine as its cause. Diversity of reIationships is present, but 
the term through which they are expressed is one and the same. The essential 
character of this mode of analogy is that "only the primary analogate realizes 
the perfection formally, whereas the others have it only by extrinsic de- 
nomination." By contrast, "analogous by proportionality are called those 
things which have a common name and the notion expressed by this name 
is proportionally the same." Or to say the same in a different way, analogous 
by proportionality are called those things which have a common name, and 
the notion expressed by this name is similar according to a proportion. 
Proper proportionality must be distinguished from those cases when the 
common term has absolutely one formal meaning which is realized in one 
of the analogates and predicated of the other by metaphor. 
A less accepted but nonetheless important tradition comes from the 
Spanish Counter Reformation Jesuit, Suarez.*Vn his DisputationesMeza- 
physicae, he charged that Cajetan misinterprets Aquinas's doctrine of 
analogy at two primary points. Suarez denied that Aquinas teaches an 
analogy of proper proportionality in which the analogous name is predicated 
properly and intrinsically of all the analogates. He insisted that every valid 
analogy of proportionality includes an  element of metaphor and impropriety. 
Moreover, Suarez held that Aquinas not only teaches an  analogy of extrinsic 
attribution, but one in which the analogy denominating form is found 
intrinsically in all terms. It is in one absolutely and in the other relatively, 
through intrinsic relation to  the former. Suarez's claim as  against Cajetan's 
is that Aquinas taught an analogy of intrinsic attribution between God and 
creation. For Aquinas, substance is being in the primary and absolute sense. 
Accident is designated from its own proper and intrinsic reality rather than 
by extrinsic denomination from the being of substance. Suarez denies that 
creation is called being because of any kind of proportionality to  God, but 
rather as it is something in itself and not absolute nothing. Lyttkens finds 
54 RICE UNIVERSITY STUDIES 
a Scotist influence; being is taken in its most general sense as fact. It is o 
this premise that Cajetan's claim that an analogous property exists perfect1 
in one term and in the other on account of a proportion or  comparison 
rejected. 
Cajetan0s position has been under attack in recent decades as tradition 
school distinctions have been reviewed in recent research.Lyttkensls 
research has been influential among Roman Catholics as well as non- 
Catholic scholars. Chavannes, accepting Lyttkens's conclusions, uses the 
in comparison of Thomistic and Barthian analogy.43 It is denied t 
Cajetan's designations can be applied to the analogy of the one and 
other found in De Potentia 7.7, Surnrna contra Gentiles 1.34, Sum 
Theologica 1.13.5, In this view, Aquinas accepted the analogy of proportio 
aIity for a limited period, but in the end abandoned or at least fell sile 
about it in favor of attribution. Suarez is mistaken in finding it to be entire 
absent from Aquinas. Lyttkens identifies three types of analogy which a 
based on direct resemblance of cause and effect: 1. an analogy of extrins 
attribution which enables one to say that created truth and goodness a 
from the divine goodness, 2. an analogy in which the image is designat 
from the prototype, 3, an analogy designating a cause from its effect. T 
analogy of proportionality found in De Veritate 2.3 in Aristotelian for 
and De Veritate 2.11 in Neoplatonic form premises an indirect resemblanc 
I .  Development of Przywara's 7hought 
Although Barth made rejection of the analogy of being primary in his 
refusal of Roman Catholic claims, analogy was only one concern among 
others in his theology. Przywara, by contrast, oriented his entire thought on 
this theme; his philosophical as well as his cultural analysis was centered on 
the idea.1 He admitted that his encounter with dialectical theology was 
crucial for his own reflection. Barth's interest was almost exclusively theo- 
logical. He raised the question of faith as well as ecclesiology in the most 
radical way in debate at Miinster in 1929. Przywara, unlike Barth, always 
proceeded from explicitly defined metaphysical premises. He made an 
Augustinian-Thomistic realism his primary reference.* Przywara's inter- 
pretation was highly individualistic and by his own admission often mis- 
understood. Nonetheless, he significantly influenced the direction of German 
Catholic philosophy in the pre-Nazi period. 
Unlike Barth, Przywara held no permanent academic position and had 
no large group of disciples. However, he ranked with Romano Guardini as 
a leading German Roman Catholic apologist in the period between the two 
world wars. Przywara lectured widely at universities throughout Europe and 
wrote a large number of articles and reviews for a select audience in Catholic 
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intellectual and scholarly journals. Living at Munich, he was a contributing 
editor of the German Jesuit magazine, Stimmen der Zeit. Incisive as well as 
outspoken in criticism, he evoked strong antipathies as well as admira- 
tion. An illness at the end of the second world war limited his personal 
appearances and travel. In spite of difficulties, he completed two large 
volumes, Mensch and Humanitas, which were published in the f i f t i e~ .~  In 
both, he used the analogy of being to develop a philosophy of culture and 
history as well as of world religions. Przywara's own metaphysics is needlessly 
confusing if one fails to understand that it is not simply scholastic. This is 
very clear from his own description of the development of his thought over 
a period of decades. 
Przywara describes the chronology of his study and writing in the preface 
of his brief, compact volume entitled Analogia Entis.4 Aquinas's Quaestiones 
disputatae and De ente et essentia were researched intensively in an early 
period of study at Valkenburg College in Holland before the first world 
war. He describes his intent as one of understanding the text as against later 
reformulations. Attempting t o  delineate the interrelation between philosophy 
and theology, Przywara read Augustine, Pseudo-Dionysius, and the German 
mystics. Subsequently, he was attracted to Goethe's interpretation of polarity 
as well as to the heroism of Nietzsche and the dynamism of Troeltsch. In the 
development of his apologetic, he read and reflected on the works of Kant, 
Hegel, and Kierkegaard. Cowpers divides Przywara's career into four 
periods.5 His first major book combined ideas from John Henry Cardinal 
Newman and Max ScheIer. Already in this writing, he identified the analogy 
of being as an inner Catholic principle which preserves the unity of the 
natural and supernatural as well as philosophy and theology. Przywara was 
concerned to show that Newman was not the father of modernism. Scheler's 
phenomenological method provided the key for the analysis of religious 
experience, although it premised an immediacy of knowledge which 
Przywara rejected. His Religionsbegriindung was in part an answer to 
Scheler's Eternal in Man.6 
A second stage of Przywara's concern dates from the debate with Barth. 
Earlier his approach to the analogy of being had been primarily philosoph- 
ical. Przywara speaks of the necessity of crossing weapons with Barth, who 
drove him back to theological presuppositions. A third stage, overlapping 
somewhat with others, is to  be described from the perspective of his criticism 
of the ideas of Husserl and Heidegger. Przywara appraised Husserl's 
phenomenology in discussion with Edith Stein and developed his own 
notion of creatureliness in answer to Heidegger. A fourth stage is marked 
by his response to the French-Belgian Thomism which took its orientation 
from J. MarCchal's Le Point de Dkpart de la Metaphysique.7 MarCchal 
attempted to reconstruct Thomistic philosophy employing Kantian episte- 
mology. Przywara believed that MarCchal's formulation neglected the unity 
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of philosophy and theology in Aquinas even as it misunderstood the role of 
negative theology. In particular, he criticized Neo-scholastic claims for an 
intuition of being. 
Przywara's early writings have been republished in a series edited by his 
former student, Hans Urs von Ba1thasar.Vrzywara's basic outlook was 
already clear in his five lectures entitled God, delivered in 1924 at the Uni- 
versity of Leipzig. Sponsored by the bishop, the series attempted to  clarify 
the differences between Roman Catholic and Protestant thought in relation 
to the philosophy of religion. An Augustinian theme of "God in us and God 
over us" was explicit and dominant. Przywara's study Religionsphilosophie 
katholischer Theologie, appeared in 1926 as  part of a series for which Emil 
Brunner wrote the companion Protestant volume.~haracter is t ical ly ,  it 
combined phiIosophica1 and theological themes in a metaphysics of analogy. 
Translated by A. C. Bouquet under the English title of Polarity, it is the 
only one of his books available in English. Przywara argued that the 
Augustinian and Thomistic positions complement each other, and explained 
the analogy of being from a phenomenological, historical point of view. 
Analogia Entis I, published in 1932, contains a careful account of this theme 
in the thought of Plato and Aristotle as well as a commentary on Augustine 
and Aquinas as their Christian successors. The first volume of Analogia 
Entis bears the sub-title "principles," and is highly concise. Przywara pro- 
jected a second volume which was never completed. His lengthy unpublished 
lecture notes from the period between Religionsphilosoplzie katholischer 
Theologie and Analogia Entis have been available in typewritten form for 
this study. Together with Mensch and Humanitas, they supply the back- 
ground for the often summary claims of Analogia Entis. 
Przywara's use of the expression analogia entis dates from 1922. As 
early as 1915, he had spoken of "God in us and God over us" to designate 
the "last" religious relation between God and creation. The analogy of being 
has this meaning in his thought. It is the key to understanding the tension 
between immanence and transcendence. Analogy in this form defines the 
dynamic "in-over" relation which is the basis of his metaphysics. Religiously, 
it can be described by the words "love" and "night."'Wven a cursory review 
of Przywara's works soon makes clear that he does not regard the analogy 
of being as a deductive reference for the attributes of deity as in Neo- 
scholastic usage. Much less is it a formula from which Roman Catholic 
dogma can be derived as Barth implied in his early polemic. For Przywara, 
Thomism is not the only Roman Catholic formulation of the themes and 
relationships which analogy makes explicit. The existential relations of 
immanence and transcendence are not to be exhausted by any single formula. 
Przywara's approach is fundamentally phenomenological in the Roman 
Catholic tradition, In defense of his many-sided interpretation, he insists 
that analogia entis has had a variety of different historical forms. Six basic 
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types are identified in his Religionsphilosophie katholischer Theologie: 
early Patristic, Augustinian, Thomistic, Scotist, Molinist, and the nine- 
teenth century mode of Newman.li Przywara believes that all six types have 
an existential as well as essential unity in Roman Catholic reflection and 
devotion and he refuses to debate the distinctions between different Catholic 
schools in detail. His typology in the end reduces to two basic forms, 
~ugust inian and Thomistic. These are complementary and to be understood 
as "bothland" rather than "either/or." Not Augustine or Thomas but 
~ugus t ine  and Thomas, he wrote. 
2. AnaIogia Entis as a Rornan Catholic Principle 
No doubt there are advantages and disadvantages in Przywara's broad 
identification of analogy as the principle of form and structure in Roman 
Catholic thought. Such a premise gave him a many-sided reference for his 
debate with Protestant dialectical theology as  well as non-CathoIic philos- 
ophy. It is important to note that in his Analogia Entis he ascribes greater 
originality to Plato than to Aristotle in deveIoping this idea. His inclusive 
Catholic context, which took as much from Augustine as Aquinas, was not 
always understood by his friends, much less his opponents. Przywara did 
invoke Aristotle a t  one important point, using his potentiality-actuality 
distinction against Heidegger's view of being, as well as in redefinition of the 
idea of creation as against dialectical theology. In principle, he called on the 
"essentialism" of the Hebrew-Greek synthesis against that which he re- 
garded as the incompleteness of modern existentialism and theological 
irrationalism. The phenomenology of Scheler and Husserl, in particular, 
seemed relevant in overcoming the "immanentism" and "subjectivism" 
which he found so dominant since the Enlightenment. Of course, their 
contribution was philosophical more than theological. 
Przywara argued that his analogical approach has much deeper roots in 
the Christian theological tradition than Barth's attempt to deny all natural 
theology. Like Paul Tillich, he believed that the perennial human question 
is one of being." Although philosophical truth is to be distinguished from 
Christian revelation, the two are not antithetical. In fact, a concern for 
reality unites philosophy and theology and both impinge on mystery. Only 
an incomplete answer can be given at the philosophical level; however, the 
natural knowledge of God, and not faith alone, is the appropriate beginning 
for Christian reflection. Ever since his early study of Scheler and Newman, 
Przywara favored phenomenoIogy over existentialism in reinterpreting the 
patristic-scholastic analogy of being. The antithesis between life and form, 
the empirical and the rational, aposteriori and a priori were highlighted by 
Scheler. Przywara linked these polarities with the essence-existence cate- 
gories of Thomism. A key premise, dominant in a11 of Przywara's writings 
since his earliest study of Aquinas's works, appears in the priority which he 
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assigns to the polarity between existence and essence. Phenomenologically, 
no moment in human experience encompasses existence or essence in their 
fullness. The tension between the two characterizes all of creaturely life but 
not that of the deity, Przywara insists that our reflection cannot collapse 
existence into essence or the reverse. The analogy of being not only explains 
the dynamic reciprocal movement between essence and existence, but 
shows as well how both are directed "over-out" to deity. 
Przywara's appreciation of the essence-existence polarity was enriched 
psychologically by phenomenology. He describes the human ego as showing 
a double direction: on the one hand, it has a dynamic toward the self- 
enclosedness of self-contained immanence; on the other hand, it looks 
toward an object beyond consciousness which is characterized by transcen- 
dence. Thought, feeling, and will all share the polarity between immanent 
unity and direction to outer fullness in an infinite object. Such analysis has 
consequences for religion. Too often, it has been understood excIusively 
either as an act of man or of God. Przywara identifies a third basic mode 
which transcends these extremes: an  infinite striving which relates the two 
types and makes clear that the absolute is not man but God. In principle 
analogical, it allows dynamic tension as well as openness to a transcendent 
source of creativity. From such a phenomenology, the analogy of being can 
be described as a mean which unites immanence and transcendence in 
dynamic tension as well as openness to an independent source of creativity. 
The underlying premise of this third view is the unity in tension of im- 
manence and transcendence, God in us and over us. An analogical reference 
relates the two positively rather than causing them to break apart in dis- 
junction. Przywara premises that polarity between essence and existence 
can be explained only from a second unity in difference, namely, that 
between creator and creation. If God is the ground of being as Tillich 
explains, analogy is implicit in the tension between the infinite and finite, 
absolute and relative, temporal and eternaI. 
Przywara's presupposition that finite being is analogical in its immanent 
structure and dynamic, "from God out" as well asL'to God," has Augustinian 
as much as Thomistic bases. He believes that creation by its very nature 
stands over against the transcendent and absolute, characterized by a restless 
need for completion beyond itself, No analogy would be necessary if the 
absolute were realized fully. However, man is a unity of being and non-being 
and lives in tension between the universal and a need for experience. Al- 
though he seeks for total possession of the object of knowledge in complete 
understanding, distance remains. Nonetheless, finite being is bound analo- 
gously to a transcendental logos in God himself. This is in part the meaning 
of the doctrine of creation. Although we ourselves possess no comprehensive 
logos, there is no  need to abandon thought to contradiction. The analogy of 
being enables us to think from the deepest mystery of God himself without 
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over-stepping the limits of our finitude. We exist as independent beings 
outside the divine yet in likeness as well as unlikeness to deity. Analogy 
becomes the central point from which all else is judged when we come to 
understand our finitude. Non-being is understood from being. All that we 
possess in the relative completeness of our person is nothing but total 
dependency on the absolute ground. In the broadest sense, analogy signifies 
that the human person has a transcendental openness in thought to being. 
Przywara believes that every philosophy which seeks to  treat the meaning 
of reality "in depth" must face the question of analogy afresh. A transcen- 
dental relation to an absolute is implicit in all thought. Yet one must be led 
to the absolute by the non-absolute. Pre-Christian formulation of the idea 
began when the Greeks asked how it is possible to have a plurality of beings 
in a fundamental unity of being.13 In the end, their reflection turned to the 
relation of the finite and infinite as well as the one and the many. Analogy 
was used to explicate the relation of finite being to a transcendental cause. 
It implies a hierarchy in which a single and infinite transcendental term is 
implicit from the beginning. Agnosticism is avoided as it is recognized that 
knowledge can be true without ceasing to be finite. The dialectic of thought 
moves amid many different possibiIities, seeking to identify a logos but still 
separated from it in tension; the logos stands beyond all immediacy in the 
world. Analogy makes clear that absolute being is transcendent while still 
immanent in the world, as the origin of finite creatures as well as their last 
goal. Imperfection has a direction toward perfection. In this way, all beings 
have a greater or lesser part in the unity of being. 
Przywara believes chat Barth's proposal to deny all natural knowledge of 
deity and then recover the field by special revelation gives away too much. 
He defends the naturaf knowledge of God against fideism as much as 
agnosticism.l"is analogy of being is an attempt to formulate an inclusive 
but specific answer to the question, "How can we speak of God?" Analogy 
allows valid but not exhaustive understanding. Przywara attempts to treat 
knowledge of God and the world in an inclusive rather than a reductionistic 
context. He claims that the analogy of being is both a metaphysical and 
religious principle which allows theology its own proper scope in freedom 
while still relating it to thephilosophiaperennis. Roman Catholic philosophy 
need not speak of deity in simply confessional terms, because its religious 
premises clarify the relation between immanence and transcendence, bring- 
ing balance and inclusiveness to Roman Catholic thought and life.Is Joining 
nature and supernature, it proceeds on the premise that God is the ground 
and goal of creation, its beginning and end. Analogical description makes 
explicit that God is immanent in the world, present by his power while still 
beyond all likeness of the creature. Przywara believes that the analogy of 
being is a unique resource for making explicit an asymmetrical relation 
between God and the world of creation. He emphasizes that for the Catholic 
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tradition of the metaphysics of theism, God is not limited to matter or 
spirit, but beyond all creation "over out." 
Is Przywara justified in making the analogy of being the structural 
principle of the metaphysics of theism'? His claim is that such a perspective 
alone offers the possibility of authentic religious knowledge. Christian 
truth has its source in a reality which is not just immanent but transcendent. 
Revelation affirms God's active providence together with his mystery. The 
analogy of being makes possible a rationally negotiable knowledge of God. 
Przywara describes it as premising a mean between the two extremes of 
pantheism and theopanism. The first limits the divine to immanence while 
the other attributes all efficacy to  God alone in his transcendence. The 
analogy of being bridges the extremes as  a middle way. Premised on 
Aquinas's principle of second cause, it allows positive freedom for the 
creature while still affirming God's all-effective power. Without such a mean, 
Przywara argues, contradiction replaces polarity in the relation between 
immanence and transcendence. According to Przywara, the Protestant 
refusal to consider the problem of religious knowledge apart from faith 
tends to Iead to a perspectivism and relativism which vitiates any positive 
relationship between God and the world. Of course, Barth's view, as  much 
as that of Przywara, is premised on the Augustinian doctrine of faith 
seeking understanding. Yet more than Barth, Przywara insists that there are 
structures of understanding in the world which, although incomplete, are 
nonetheless valid, The analogy of being does not destroy the tension between 
creation and creator. Rather, it is a hermeneutical principle which premises 
a dynamic relation between man and God. 
Cowpers points out that Przywara's often obtuse and complicated 
terminology may be explained in part as a n  attempt to penetrate beyond 
stereotyped meanings . lWe wishes to "see" as well as to experience. His 
position is distinguished from Neo-scholasticism at this point: words have 
a discovering and expIicative function which is only partially apparent in the 
first naming of reality. Meaning cannot be calculated directly, but requires 
sensitivity together with originality, It becomes known more fully through 
continuous contact with experience. Przywara's analogy analysis has an 
evident twofold premise. He first describes a polarity between essence and 
existence in human thought, and secondly, a tension between man's finite 
being and its absolute ground. Human thought and being are analogous in 
a double way. We are never in total possession of or identical with our being. 
More than this, human life and thought are always directed beyond them- 
selves to  the infinite. Analogy makes explicit that the absolute is immanent 
in our thought even as it remains transcendent. Analogy enables us to 
understand the unity and diversity of history from the inside out, as it were. 
I t  denotes an  "in-over" which is the dynamic intellectual basis of all finite 
thinking. Acknowledging the contingency of both past and present, Przywara 
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seeks an objective synthesis. The unity in the history of thought 
is not only transcendental, one may say, but also transcendent. Not finite 
but absolute being is its ground. Przywara urges that our understanding is 
always in tension with thought in its purity. Not only is this true for each 
concrete individual thinker, it is reflected as well in the organic development 
of human thought. The analogy of being enables us to identify structure and 
arrange data systematicaIly. Indeed, it enables us to put ourselves at the 
central point of historical critical reflection from the beginning. 
Przywara interprets Christian theological analogy as at the same time an 
appropriation and criticism of Greek metaphysics, in a conversion made 
by revelation. However one evaluates this claim, it is clear that he 
takes a critical rather than a simply cumulative view of the philosophical 
tradition. Moreover, his interpretation of Greek philosophy is in part a 
refutation of Heidegger's exposition.17 Przywara describes the Platonic 
view of knowledge as a dynamic mean between being and becoming. It does 
not allow us to speak of the many without reference to the transcendent one 
which in turn can be known only analogically in term.; of the many. 
Przywara's religious epistemology is in a variety of respects more Augustinian 
than Thomistic. He insists that conceptualization does not exhaust meaning 
and finds an element of ineffability in all knowledge. He is not prepared to 
give up the quest for unity, but finds that it is never self-complete in the 
worId. Przywara? approach is less propositional than intuitional, from the 
center outward as it were. He concludes that it does not matter whether we 
begin with the empirical or the rational, experience or thought. All meanings 
are interrelated in a context of being. The immanence-transcendence relation 
implicit in all quests for truth applies in particular to religious experience. 
Przywara believes that he can identify an analogical pattern of distance and 
approach, fear and love, in all Roman Catholic piety. 
3. Przywara's Interpretation ofAnalogy 
Przywara's own distinctive interpretation joins the two major types of 
analogy identified by Cajetan, the analogy of attribution and the analogy 
of proportionality, in interdependence. According to Przywara, the first has 
its completion in the second.18 The analogy of attribution is only the first 
impulse of a rising movement in our knowledge. Indeed, unity, essence, 
truth, good are affirmed of God and the creature. However, the analogy of 
attribution does not bring the differences between the two into balance. If 
it did, this balance rather than being itself would have become the basis of 
our explanation. Instead, resemblance rests finally on a relation to a tran- 
scendent and dissemblant term. Przywara argues that the analogy of 
attribution is exceeded by one of proportionality a t  the limit of our intelli- 
gence. The movement of the creature is brought in balance beyond its inner 
limitation by the being of God. The ever-greater mysterious being of deity 
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is recognized as the basis of the first analogy. It is in this context that 
Przywara develops a descending analogy of attribution in order to make 
clear that the divine essence, although above all concepts, is not just an idea1 
limit. Rather, God's transcendence breaks through and dominates all 
immanence. 
The natural disclosure of God in the initial analogy of attribution identifies 
the divine being as the absolute foundation, god ,  and meaning of created 
essence. Przywara argues for a point of contact: the human being itself is a 
disclosure of God, who has created man as a free agent. Analogy is possible 
only as it is recognized that created being is a real second cause. However, 
even at this initial level it becomes clear that analogy is a disclosure of 
differencemore than resemblance; absolute truth belongs to the transcendent 
and different alone. Theism must avoid the magical deduction of pantheism 
in which everything comes out of non-being and becomes divine. It cannot 
regard the finite as a manifestation of the absolute in the contingent. Instead, 
it affirms a greater dissimilarity than similarity between creative cause and 
contingent effect. 
Przywara abandons any simple attribution in terms of cause and effect. 
Created reason, he argues, has no ground in itself. In the end, God's infinite 
and inexhaustible positiveness dominates participating truth. Analogy 
makes clear that we cannot sacrifice either the non-absolute or the absolute. 
Sacrifice of the first ends in theopanism in which God is regarded as the 
alone-working, and of the second in the magical deduction of pantheism in 
which everything comes out of non-being. Analogy is a formal expression of 
a movement toward the absolute which is present in every existence. It is not 
a principle by which the deity becomes manageable or can be derived; 
instead, it makes for openness. The analogy of being identifies creaturely 
being in its total potentiality as directed toward its source, goal, and meaning. 
The starting point or source is not non-being. Rather, we begin from the 
fullness of reality in deity, 
Przywara's distinctive "conversionist" position is made clear in What is 
God?, published soon after the second world war.19 The analysis in this 
brief study develops six stages or steps toward the knowledge of God. His 
divergence from Barth's position is evident from the outset, as he indeed 
premises a natural knowledge of God. Initially, the divine is known as a 
quality of creation. It is the last depth of the world, evident in life and spirit 
as well as the careers of great men. Such a n  experience of the numinous, 
although authentic, is only a first step on the way to growing understanding. 
At a second stage, God is known as a formal limit who is over against man 
as finite and timebound. Deity, by contrast, is absolute, infinite, and perfect. 
In a third and successive stage, God is known as an immanent ideal of pure 
truth, goodness, and beauty. The "conversionist" character of Przywara's 
approach is especially clear in his description of the fourth level. It reflects 
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the appreciation for the theologia crucis which characterizes his post-war 
writings more than his earlier works. Deity is known as personal; God is 
not just pure being, but the living one, judging, righteous, and merciful. At 
a further stage, God is understood as struggling over his creation, personally 
and historically, in love. He is a destroying fire, but also paradoxically the 
silent, powerless God, forced outside the world by the sin which has crucified 
him. Yet this is not all. At a final level, God is seen as overpowering and 
blinding light, ever greater over all. 
Przywara begins with a direct, positive theology which attempts to unite 
the absolute and the personal, the unchangeable and the living. He turns to 
an indirect dialectical theology of darkness as conflicting claims develop. 
How can God be all and yet be free, we ask? Przywara's response to this 
question, like that of Barth, is fundamentally Christocentric. His final 
reference in the doctrine of God is neither nature nor spirit, but crucifixion 
and resurrection-light appearing in darkness. Christ alone is the fullness 
of revelation. Those who have seen him have seen the Father. Przywara 
develops a similar multi-level conversionist approach in his Christology. 
Christ is seen as the shepherd, friend, bridegroom, and brother. Our first 
knowledge is direct and concrete. In the Incarnation, God appears as the 
ideal of the creature, but on the border of human life. Even as he is known 
in the fullness of his love, God is still a mystery which must be sought after. 
We must proceed indirectly in dialectic. Not simply in essence but in 
existence, the analogy of being joins immanence and transcendence. In the 
end, the analogy of being yields knowledge in the fact that grace is effective. 
As the limit of creation, God is not just an ideal but power, a source of 
spiritual life. 
At its first level, Przywara's analysis of analogy appears to deal with a 
purely external relation. However, in reality there is an intrinsicism under 
the extrinsicism. He finds that no single created essence can be the basis of 
the whole, and concludes that intrinsic resemblance, not just a third term, is 
necessary for analogy. The causality identified in the analogy of proportion 
must be carried to its final consequence in reflection. The incomplete being 
of the resemblance leads to recognition of difference. There is no total 
resemblance between any two essences. Extrinsicism disappears in the 
perfection of the analogy between God and creature. Intrinsic resemblance 
belongs to the attribution itself. It is a perfection not completed simply by 
our thought. The predicate in analogical judgment is caused by God who is 
its subject. It is not just an element which happens in a particular case, but 
necessary in any positive attribution. Hence, Przywara concludes that the 
analogy of attribution surpasses itself in the analogy of proportionality, but 
is not replaced by it. Proportionality cannot be separated or made fully 
self-sufficient from attribution. The end would be verbalism and agnosticism. 
Ultimately, all three movements which Przywara describes constitute a 
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single analogy. The analogy of proportionality seeks to represent the infinite 
distance between God and the creature without giving up resemblance. 
Actually, the transcendent unity of all being and intelligibility cannot be 
represented by any concept. Analogy can only indicate a direction. Concepts 
are not false, but totally insufficient. We know God only through his mani- 
festations as he both reveals and hides himself in the finite context. 
For Przywara, the analogy of attribution is more appropriately described 
as a necessary foundation rather than a starting point. In order to grasp the 
unity of finite and infinite even in limited degree, we must follow the direction 
toward the absolute present in all our judgments. Beginning with the finite 
essence, we move away from it in proportionality. Przywara finds a continu- 
ally transcendent movement in all manifestations of our spiritual activity. Of 
course, the power of our representation in thought is irrevocably surpassed 
by the infinity of the object. The "in-over" tension in which we ground the 
transcendence of God is at the same time the tension from which the finite 
is designated as finite. In most explications of analogy, the idea is invoked 
only after the existence of God has been proved. It does not stand at the 
beginning of metaphysical reflection as in Przywara. He admits that a full 
understanding of analogy must come at the end of our reflection. However, 
he emphasizes that a minimum has been presupposed from the outset. A 
metaphysic based on analogy is conscious of its distance from the transcen- 
dent; there is no direct knowledge of God. Yet its metaphysical values are 
from the absolutely transcendent. 
4. Evaluation and Criticism 
It is Przywara's fundamental premise that the natural universe has its 
fullness in a sacramental one. He is sure that the absolute and eternal can be 
known in the world. Concept and mystery are interrelated in a universe filled 
with meaning, Man's being is directed beyond itself to transcendence. Reason 
and faith stand in positive relation to each other. Although God transcends 
every hierarchy and any essence, any ultimate irrationality or voluntarism 
is excluded. For Przywara, philosophical analysis and religious authority join 
t o  confirm that we are existentially in touch with reality. The fundamental 
issue remains as to whether he has established analogy as a link between God 
and creation, or he simply presupposes it? The epistemological questions 
directed by Thomists as well as other philosophers against Przywara's eclec- 
ticism cannot be ignored. Przywara's initial point of reference appears to be 
more anthropological than cosmological, namely, the analogy tension in man 
himself. Cowpers charges that he really has no systematic ep i s t em~logy .~~  
If it were charged that Przywara's first premises cannot be proved logically, 
he would no doubt reply by pointing to the tension between essence and 
existence. As against existentialism and idealism, he argues that life in the 
world has a logos of both thought and being; there can be no "either/orV 
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between the two. If it is argued that he takes an ontological dimension for 
granted, he could reply that he explicates it phenomenoIogically. Przywara's 
interpretation is strongly influenced by Neoplatonism even though he accepts 
~hris t ian revelation. God is beyond all categories and conceptual knowledge. 
In Przywara's view, the negative leads to the positive in a fuller knowledge. 
How does Przywara's interpretation stand in relation to  the longer tradition 
of analogy usage? Does he agree with Cajetan, Suarez, or Scotus? The answer 
must be that Przywara's own view is eclectic; in the end, he champions a 
mixed type of analogy. His synthesis is based on his own extensive historical 
research and is not limited to any single school. 
One may ask specifically, what can be known about God? It becomes 
evident, in reply, that Przywara is arguing for a relation between the infinite 
and finite more than for any definite content. The fullness of the relation 
between God and man, both epistemologically and ontologically, has an 
existential religious basis in the Church.21 It needs to be recognized that 
Przywara's analogy of being represents a modification of the epistemological 
bases of the scholastic synthesis, especially at the point of the natural knowl- 
edge of God. His fellow Roman Catholic, Pflenge, is very specific in charging 
that a "kathodic" rather than "anodic" view is represented.22 The key to much 
of Przywara's view, as well as its limitations, appears in his use of phenome- 
nology. His claim for general revelation allows him to invoke analogy in an 
inclusive phenomenology which looks to the word of the Church for defini- 
tive statement. Przywara used this method for theological as we11 as philo- 
sophical ends, and in this respect exceeded any intent of Husserl. In his view, 
religion and metaphysics have an intrinsic interrelation and can be separated 
only relatively. Of course, the religious appropriation of phenomenology is 
evident in Max Scheler's Catholic period before his "relapse" into naturalism. 
It is questionable whether phenomenology as a presuppositionless philosophy 
yields the ontological bases necessary to support Przywara's theism. 
It is dialogue with Protestants which calls the basic presupposition of the 
earlier synthesis of nature and grace into question. Przywara offered a ration- 
ale in its defense with his analogy of being. He recognized that Aquinas's 
assumptions about the human person, faith, and reason represent only one 
expression of the Christian consciousness. However, he limited authentic 
variation to a Roman Catholic context. Driven back on theological claims, 
his philosophical analysis weakened as much as it strengthened his apologetic 
stance. Gertz has writtenan extended exposition of Przywara's analogia fidei, 
arguing that it has the dominant role in Przywara's post-war writings.23 At 
very least, this represents a shift from Przywara's earlier claims for the anal- 
ogy of being as a principle of form in the philosophia perennis. One is left 
with a religious base, to be sure, already explicit in Przywara's Deus Semper 
Maior. The question remains as to whether analogy, interpreted in such a 
predominantly ecclesiastical context, is an adequate premise for philosoph- 
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ical claims. If the natural knowledge of God is not distinct from faith, the 
analogy of being alone cannot serve as an initial reference. Przywara's 
position appears to have a circular character at this point. Our question is, 
how much he can defend analogy apart from a religious apriorz? He develops 
a kind of Augustinian existentialism in terms of "faith seeking understand- 
ing." However, he insists as well on inclusive and objective metaphysical 
structures for synthesis. 
The analogy of being may be described a s  a convergence principle, 
Vorverstandnis or a beginning point for reflection, but in no case is it simply 
abstract. For Przywara, it is not a formula for deriving deity but a movement 
toward him. As a negative reductive reference, it reflects the rhythm of the 
creator-creation relation to which all returns. Yet it allows for the ever new 
and is most radical and open. Metaphysically necessary, it is yet theological. 
Religion and metaphysics have reciprocal inclusion rather than congruence 
in Przywara's view. The unity of creaturely essence is not in us but over us, 
from and in God. Although there is no direct unity in essence of man and 
God, the self-reflection of the knowing subject, itself a union of essence and 
existence, has an analogical relation to truth. Przywara's exposition presup- 
poses at least two degrees of being." The first, an "immanent creaturely" one, 
has its basis in the tension between essence and existence. Man as finite is 
never identical with his essence. Instead, it unfolds before him temporally. 
The finite, never totally what it is, cannot be absolute. Essence remains above 
existence. Analogy expresses the immanent-transcendent relation. It makes 
clear that religion is not exclusively an act of God or  man. Natural religion 
leads to the supernatural, the act of man to  the act of God. In the end, 
analogy meanspotentia obredientialis to the divine command. 
Analogy is premised on our capacity to  know and resemble absolute per- 
fection. Such perfection is experienced as a lack in being by the finite essence. 
The positive attribution derived from natural theology yields to negation but 
is more than agnosticism. The analogy relation itself is imperfect, one-sided, 
and partial. Only finite being is immediately accessible to us. The deepest 
basis of analogy lies in the tension between the absolute and finite, God and 
creation. God is actively present to the creature, knowable and still above it. 
The more God opens himself, the more he is covered by mystery. In the end, 
Przywara's formulation is a mean between an immanent creaturely analogy 
and a second analogy between an immanent and transcending term, In the 
first, there is a tension between two non-transcending terms. In the second, 
absolute transcendence is invoked. The critical question is whether Przywara 
uses analogy equivocally. It is important to note that the "in-over" relation 
has a very different meaning in the second as against the first level of analogy. 
Przywara's defense of his position turns on appraisal of his doctrine of 
positive potentiality. He refuses to  make potentiality into an  absolute as in 
Heidegger's metaphysic of finitude. Pure potency cannot be a metaphysical 
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nothing, as Heidegger supposes. Theologically, Przywara argues that 
"Nothing" is a relation through the agency of "God as creator from nothing." 
Cowpers emphasizes that the distinctive character of Przywara's interpre- 
tation lies in the fact that he does not conceive of the analogy of being as 
static; instead, he premises a tension between experience and rationality. 
Although our understanding expresses itself in iixed points, it nonetheless 
remains open in receptiveness as well as spontaneity." More than most Neo- 
scholastics, Przywara emphasizes the historicity imposed by finitude. Crea- 
turely knowledge is the rationalizing of experience. Przywara does not mean 
that philosophy, much less theology, can be deduced from his analogy 
reference. On the contrary, both have a realistic character. Analogy has a 
necessary historical basis. Experience is characterized by an inevitable 
dialectic between logic and experience, the apriori and the aposteriori in the 
structure of the human mind itself. Contingency remains even when we seek 
to know in the most complete and perfect way. Even in the midst of history, 
the analogy of being enables one to  discover the rational order and build on 
it. Premised on the intelligibility of being, it enables us to penetrate to the 
deepest center of meaning. Przywara uses analogy to think through problems 
logically and develop a balanced systematic interpretation. Yet systems are 
relativized and even dissolve in his view. His belief in universals is qualified 
by the conviction that nothing is ever completely definite. Analogy is a 
necessary reference in the end because we never possess the truth in totality. 
Przywara believes that philosophers and theologians need to guard in par- 
ticular against the repetition of identifying phrases as if they were exhaustive. 
No formula is definitive. At most, it is a temporary fixation point from which 
we may proceed to new insight. 
Przywara's Deus Semper Maiar has strong affinities with Barth's view of 
transcendence.'b Przywara is explicit that the God of creation and revelation 
is not derived from analogy. On the contrary, analogy is necessary because 
God has revealed himself. According to Przywara, Aquinas emphasized the 
independence and integrity of nature.27 The order of salvation is also con- 
crete; Christ is the middle. It must be pointed out that man as conceived 
concretely, in Przywara's view, is not simply natural being. The human 
person cannot be understood as simply neutral. His choice is between the 
gods of the heathen or the one personal God of Catholicism, between Chris- 
tian and anti-Christian humanism. Przywara believes that all creation has a 
relation of negative potentiality to God. His interest is in the historical, 
factual world order, and he uses phenomenology to develop a concrete 
epistemology. He deals with the concrete man phenomenologicalIy in terms 
of "heilsgeschichte." He insists that nature has its own freedom even as he 
describes man as having a natural-supernatural nature.28 Przywara views 
original sin as Barth does, as an overbearing grasping of creation toward 
God. In the fall, there was not simply loss but usurpation and perversion. 
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Sin is not just a lowering of the creature's relation to God, but its tearing and 
reversal. In his exposition of Romans 1:18, he distinguishes between recog- 
nition and acknowledgment. Przywara does not conceive of original sin just 
in terms of the loss of the supernatural and relapse to nature alone. Fallen 
man has no way to a universal concept of the supernatural. He must turn to 
the cross instead. Recognition of the antithesis between law and Gospel 
appears in Przywara's later works. He identifies a dialectic as between wrath 
and promise, law and GospeI, not only in man but God. Przywara eveq 
speaks of philosophy being given life through death. 
Przywara's specific Roman Catholic apologetic claim is made clear in an 
article entit!ed "The Range of Analogy as the Fundamental Catholic Form." 
He notes that the formula with which he describes it, "great similarity in ever 
greater dissimilarity," comes from a source which antedates Aquinas's 
writings, namely, the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215. This twelfth ecumen- 
ical council met under Pope Innocent 111, and rejected Joachim of Floris's 
interpretation of the Trinity. Joachim spoke of a "fourness" in God, citing 
John 12:22ff. The Church, he argued, is one with the Father and the Son in 
the Holy Ghost. The different persons are one essentia, substantia, and 
natura, but not "unitas Vera et prop~ia,""sed collectivam et similitudinarium." 
The Council interpreted the passage from the Fourth Gospel as an injunction 
to be perfect as the Heavenly Father is perfect. The analogy is between the 
divine perfection which is a quality of God by nature and the perfection by 
grace, a quality which man receives. Przywara interprets this to refer to the 
analogical relation between God and created forms of life. Each has a 
perfection in its own mode. 
Even without mentioning analogy explicitly, Przywara concludes, the 
Council affirmed it as the principle of structure of Catholic belief. "Qui inter 
Creatorem et creaturam non potest tanta similitude notari, quin inter eos 
maior sit dissimilitudo notanda." In making a clear distinction between 
creator and creation, the Council at  the same time affirmed the sovereign 
ecclesiastical authority of the Church over against pneumatism. Przywara 
emphasizes that its decree was not bound to the language of any particular 
school of theology. There were, in fact, three major alternatives current at 
the time. The Greek tradition viewed nature as a purely passive potentiality, 
the becoming side of participation in God, Augustine interpreted it in terms 
of the antithesis between the effect of Adam's sin and the divine work of 
Christ. The scholastics regarded it as active potency. The Council's own 
theology was expressed without subservience to any one of these views. 
Analogy becomes explicit as nature and supernature are joined analogically 
through participation in the divine nature. Przywara insists that the sover- 
eignty of the divine will is made visible in the Church and transcends any 
specific formulation. There is a real supernatural order in which the whole of 
God is present as a continuation of the Incarnation; the Church itself is an 
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analogous union, immanent and transcendent. It was Aquinas's contribution 
to  correct Gnostic identity by law and a sense of distance as he distinguished 
between creator and creation in terms of different relations to being. 
V. ANALOGY I N  THE THEOLOGY OF KARL BARTH 
1. Barth's View of the Knowledge of God 
Analogy has become of importance in ecumenical discussion primarily 
through the influence of one man, Karl Barth. More than any other Protes- 
tant theologian, he has understood its continuing importance. To be 
sure, Barth's Roman Catholic critic, Przywara, gave it a more inclusive 
scope, It was Przywara who forced Barth's outspoken rejection of the analogy 
of being as theAntichrist. Yet it is important to note that this rejection does 
not explain the totality of Barth's position. If all that he had to say about 
analogy were simply negative, the subsequent discussion of this theme would 
not have developed. In fact, it became of increasing importance in Barth's 
later thought. Basically, he was interested in the question of the knowledge 
of Cod which he believed to be badly handled in Roman Catholicism as well 
as in Protestant modernism. More than this, throughout his long career, 
Barth was concerned to come to terms with the primary affirmations of the 
Christian faith in such a way as to make Aear their basic structure and inten- 
tion. He developed a perspective which interpreters such as von Balthasar 
even in criticism designated as analogous. 
Barth's epistemology is not simply existential or post-Kantian, but theo- 
logical. It is in the latter sphere that he has had his greatest impact-for 
example, in debate with Przywara. He perennially drove his opponents back 
to reIigious first principles. One cannot find a simply philosophical episte- 
mology, much less a philosophy of religion, in Barth. This is not to  say that 
he is philosophically uncritical or without metaphysical affirmations. How- 
ever, he resists all joining of philosophy and theology, nature and grace in 
eclectic synthesis. It is not the question of being, a term which Barth does 
not hesitate to use, but God which is primary. Of course, faith has a central 
role in Barth's exposition, but it is always faith seeking understanding. 
Analogy became important in the attempt to see a synoptic whole as well as 
to identify structure. 
Barth's rejection of the Enlightenment Protestant outlook, dominant 
throughout the last century, led the way in a renewed emphasis on the classi- 
cal tradition of the Reformation. His so-called "theology of crisis" was 
characterized by a fresh and urgent consciousness of the actuality of deity. 
Particularly outspoken against the confusion of trust in man with faith in 
Cod, Barth refused all religious experience and philosophical reflection as 
ways t o  deity. Major attention first came to him with the publication of his 
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commentary on the Epistle to the Romans in 1919. Barth emphasized that 
the Christian God is not just a timeless being, but one who acts in history. 
Theology is not speculation about him, but premises his Word of grace 
uttered in his mighty acts. Barth spoke of an infinite qualitative difference 
between man and God. Deity is to be distinguished from all earthly reality as 
holy. God's Word brings a crisis to human life as it "breaks in" eschatologi- 
cally. Barth refused to argue the question of God's existence. Instead, he 
insisted that Christian and non-Christian claims are confused irresponsibly 
if anything other than revelation is made primary. God is not just an idea but 
the One who is gracious. 
The idea of analogy did not come into clear focus in Barth's early writings.' 
His subsequent revolt against nineteenth-century theology drew on the nega- 
tions of Overbeck and Nietzsche as well as Kierkegaard and Dostoevski. 
Modern New Testament research contributed a new eschatological sense 
which broke down traditional metaphysical structures. Christendom, in par- 
ticular, was subjected to radical reappraisal. Barth's claim that Christianity 
is outside of history had even Platonic overtones, and made reference to 
primordial history (Urgeschichte), a term used by Overbeck. His attack, 
based on a Christian conviction about the transcendence of God, was the 
antithesis of philosophical skepticism. However, it was not higher criticism 
but a renewed sense of sin which motivated Barth most deeply. Kierkegaard's 
paradoxical understanding of faith, Dostoevski's conviction that Christ's 
presence brings antithesis rather than harmony, joined with a Pauline sense 
of the judgment which comes with grace. He refused all religious a priori in 
man of the type championed by Protestant liberalism. His break with the 
analogy of being became definitive following his debate with Przywara at 
Miinster. 
Barth's rejection of ail natural knowledge of God as well as religion in 
general has been widely debated. He refused metaphysics and mysticism 
alike on thegrounds that they blunt the fundamental alternatives of Christian 
faith. Barth's own theology is an actualism, premised on the claim that God 
can be known only through God. He believed that confusion inevitably 
follows when Christianity is interpreted as a philosophy or world view. 
Barth's primary concern was not whether God exists, but who he is. The 
attempt to prove that Christianity is the most comprehensive and true 
speculative system, or that it conforms most fully to man's religious needs, 
inevitably compromises its message of judgment, grace, and forgiveness. 
Revelation does not take its meaning from the world but from the living 
reality which is above and beyond it. 
Barth's position is epitomized in his cryptic statement that there is no way 
from man to God but only a way from God to man. Religion as the antithesis 
of revelation embodies sinful man's attempt to achieve salvation apart from 
sin and grace. Not the holy as it has appeared perennially in the history of 
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religion, but faith alone brings true knowledge of God. Barth's radical 
theocentrism is a protest in principle against all claims to religious truth 
apart from revelation in Jesus Christ. He rejected Protestant natural theology 
as an attempt to encompass revelation in a pre-understanding; Roman 
Catholic sacramentalism seemed to him to seek to control grace after the 
event. He has insisted that the Word of God is an actuality which can be 
known only after its occurrence. His critique was directed against natural 
theology in Protestant scholasticism as well as liberalism. 
Barth's criticism of the misuse of analogy in other theologies, past and 
present, may be summarized as follows: analogy ought not t o  be abstract 
nor can there be any authentic but neutral concept of deity.2 All noetic or  
ontic use of the analogy of being as a means for achieving knowledge of God 
is refused. The abyss between God and man can be bridged only by Christ, 
revelation, and grace. Barth's rejection of natural theology is intended to 
make clear that we possess no available analogate of God. God cannot be 
subsumed under a category or genus; in fact, Aquinas is specific that this is 
not possible. However, Barth in criticism of Thomism denies that analogical 
description can be premised on any harmony of nature and grace. Analogy 
can only be "against us" and "out from us" to  God who is lord and creator, 
reconciler and redeemer. Barth seeks to substantiate this position from an 
exegesis of Romans 1:18; he explains that man is confronted by God as a 
Thou and not an it. There is no universal truth of revelation. Analogy is not 
from our seeing or reflection but God's Word. A valid doctrine of analogy 
must show how God is really transcendent over all our works as well as our 
concepts. God is disclosed and hid, uncovered and covered at the same time. 
Fallen man, wishing to play rich, claims to cooperate with God in the work 
of redemption. Synergism even implies that salvation is only partly in God. 
Yet real correspondence is only through God's free gift. Revelation reverses 
our words but is not univocal. Barth turns to  analogy because he will allow 
no doctrine of double truth. 
2. Barth's Analogia Fidei 
Pohlmann's study of Barth's analogy doctrine is one of the most definitive 
to date. He argues that Barth has developed his own original synthesis which 
must be examined side by side with the Platonic, Aristotelian, and Thomistic 
views. He identifies the sources of Barth's description of analogy as highly 
diverse. A doctrine of the exclusiveness of grace is taken from Anselm and 
Luther. Barth's actualism draws on German idealistic philosophy as well as 
Luther's nominalism. A Reformation dualism from Calvin and a distance 
pathos from Kierkegaard are present along with Christomonism, which has 
its roots in the pietism of both Zinzendorf and W. Herrmann. Barth's position 
is distinguished by its actualism. He proposes a Christocentrism which is 
antithetical to "ontocentrism." Analogy is aposteriori and comes exclusively 
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from one side, that of deity. Neither rational nor universal, it moves between 
a protological "not yet" and an eschatological "no more," in which any 
analogy of being is excluded. Pohlmann refuses the charge of theopanism 
against Barth's view. Barth affirms that God wills a free and independent 
creation. Christian analogy must be actualist and not substantialist. 
Pohlmann finds the following sequence in Barth's analogy doctrine: I .  We 
do not know God's Word until 2. grace makes us free to do so. 3. The Word. 
which is then known is one of identity.3 Barth's claim is that God is actus 
purus; merely God is not God. Deity is not bound to any categories and 
must remain absolutely free. We must be careful lest God become an abso- 
lute essence or universal, identical with fate. In explanation of his own 
doctrine of analogy, Barth uses such texts as Galatians 2:20, Romans 6:3, 
and Hebrews 1 1 : 1. I Corinthians 13:12 is cited in defense of Barth's claim 
that the analogy of being is precluded in a twofold way: the Word of God is 
hidden by reason of both human finitude and the rebellion of sin. There are 
thus double grounds for Barth's rejection of the analogy of being. Pdhlmann 
questions his exegesis of this passage, denying that Paul refers to both 
finitude and sin. Pohlmann observes that for Barth, analogy is a kind of 
Word of God. Barth cites Galatians 4:8 and Romans 12:6. Pohlmann also 
disputes his exegesis of the second passage, urging that it refers only to the 
limitation of charisma by faith. In his attempt to make analogy a kind of 
Word of God, Barth does not always distinguish carefully between equal 
and unequal predication. He prefers the language of similarity in dissimi- 
larity to that of equality or likeness. 
Yet it is clear that Barth does not intend to deny the relevance or validity 
of this reference. Indeed, his criticism of the analogy of being has led to fresh 
theoretical reflection by both Roman Catholics and Protestants. Knowledge 
of God is not one of being but of becoming, and analogy describes the way 
man can speak of God specifically. The question is not whether God can be 
made an object of metaphysical knowledge, but rather of the divine dis- 
closure and election. It is revelation which extends the otherwise impotent 
speech of sinful men, enabling them to speak of God. To refer merely to a 
difference of being as between God and his creation, misunderstands divine 
holiness. Even though there is no analogy to revelation, we may still speak 
of a correspondence and likeness and unlikeness between man and God. 
Barth uses a variety of terms in describing analogy: relationis, revelationis, 
gratiae, naturae, causae, operationis, attributionis, proportionalis, and 
inequalitatis." 
The presupposition of Christian theological analogy is that God comes to 
man in his Son, Jesus Christ, creating a new relation on his own initiative. 
Analogy is implicit, as God is other than his works; they do not exhaust his 
reality. Perennially, we mistake his revelation as an "it," making becoming 
into being in a static rather than a dynamic understanding. Barth insists that 
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the analogy of being cannot be justified from scripture. Indeed, it is excluded 
by the infinite qualitative distance between God and man. Barth believes 
that the being of God and man cannot be made abstract, comprehensible, 
and graspable, or described from parts or qualities. This is too static. 
Indirect knowledge cannot be made direct and rendered harmless through 
the analogy of being. The difference between God and man is not calculable. 
Instead, God remains hidden. The sovereignty of God is not to  be placed on 
a neutral basis with sinful man. 
Barth's exposition of the analogy of faith is found in sections 41 and 45 of 
the third volume of his Dogmatics. He holds that the word "person" applies 
to deity pre-eminently and to man only secondarily. While accepting the 
idea of analogy, Barth has continued to insist that the introduction of philo- 
sophical analysis of the problem of language leads to a false theology. He 
understands philosophy not so much as a systematic rational view of the 
world as a human way of thinking about anything. Its object is abstract 
while that of theology is an absolute event. Barth treats philosophy less as 
a systematic rational view of the world than as a human way of thinking 
about everything. In his actualism, he insists that Christian analogical 
knowledge of God cannot be from the point of view of the spectator. God's 
Word to man determines his existence. It is a new possibility, an uncreated 
reality identical with God himself. Barth criticizes the Lutheran scholastic 
theologian, Quenstedt, for attempting to develop an  analogy of being based 
on the distinction between absolute and relative, instead of an  analogy of 
faith and grace.5 Quenstedt's formulation makes being rather than deity 
primary, without an adequate sense of God's continuing hiddenness. Its 
analogy of intrinsic attribution in part parallels that of the Jesuit, Suarez. 
Barth hoIds we cannot premise a correlation between finite and infinite or 
man at one extreme and God at the other. Analogy is "unavoidable" not 
because it is imposed by man, but because it is chosen by God. "Pressed . . . 
by the true revelation of God, we are pushed t o  the word 'analogy'." 
3. Development of Barth's Analogy Doctrine 
Barth's positive reinterpretation of analogy is developed in his criticism of 
nineteenth-century Protestant theology as well as schoIasticism.~ndebted 
to both the Enlightenment and pietism, Protestant theologians of the period 
did not regard religious experience as rational in its own right. When Barth 
described the Word of God as a rational event, he committed himself to 
analogy in the context of revelation. Theology, he insists, takes its character 
from the rationality of its proper object. The Word of God, in Barth's view, 
is a kind of concrete universal. His criticism of medieval theology, realist or 
idealist, is that it did not achieve a proper subordination of its thought forms 
to their proper object. He views nominalism as a protest against an inade- 
quate theology rather than a satisfactory positive position in itself. Indeed, 
74 RICE UNIVERSITY STUDIES 
he finds that it was latent in the later scholastic separation between the 
being and action of God in description of the divine attributes. Barth's own 
analogy of faith is not based on nominalism or existentialism, but "faith 
seeking understanding." He interprets Anselm's premise in terms of a 
dynamic rationality which presupposes the active self-communication of 
divine truth. The utter objectivity of God prescribes the manner and limits 
of our knowledge, whiIe it is a t  the same tlme the basis of analogical predi- 
cation. Professor Thomas F. Torrance of the University of Edinburgh 
explains: 
Thua along w ~ t h  Anaelm's notlon of dyndrn~c rat~ondlity thcre goes a n o t ~ o n  of dynamic 
analogy carrying a relationship of adequacy and Inadequacy, o r  partial likeness and 
partial unl~keness, between the knowledge of f a ~ t h  and ~ t s  proper object the rnade- 
qudcy of theolog~cal statements does not mean thdt they are false, but on the contrary 
reflects the 1111th of thelr relat~on to  their object ' 
As distinguished from schoIasticism as well as the Enlightenment, Barth 
conceived of both man and God actuaIistically without any necessary refer- 
ence to nature or essence. The Christian view is not predictive but "post- 
dictive." Barth is linked to medieval theology through his study of Anselm, 
which he completed just before beginning his Church Dogmatics. Charles 
Hartshorne evaluates Barth's exposition of Anselm's ontological argument 
as an especially discerning one.8 However, even Anselm is included in Barth's 
rejection of all natural theology; Barth finds no autonomous metaphysic in 
his writings. He insists that Anselm's statement was made "in the Church" as 
an  attempt to clarify the Christian confession. Anselm's argumentation is 
theological and not anthropological. Even for Anselm, knowledge of God is 
onlyfrom God's word in faith. He did not attempt to develop a n  autonom3us 
metaphysic from the analogy of being. It is the presupposition of a second 
moment, apart from faith, that leads to a Pelagianism in which grace is made 
a quality and the divine placed at human disposal. Gottlieb Sohngen, a 
Roman Catholic who taught at the University of Munich, distinguished 
Anselm's position from that of Aquinas as inrellecrusfidei but not scientia 
f idei. 'j 
Barth believed that both Luther and Calvin would reject all natural the- 
ology in the contemporary context. Even more than the Reformers, he 
refused all attempts to  establish God's existence apart from faith. '0  Reflecting 
an indebtedness to scholasticism even in revolt against it, they presupposed 
a natural knowledge of God as the basis for moral responsibility. Even 
though Luther was strongly influenced by nominalism, he did not dismiss all 
general revelation. Calvin emphasized that the God who is revealed in the 
Decalogue as lawgiver is also redeemer in Jesus Christ. Barth's sole criterion 
1s the Word of God in Jesus Christ; there is no reIation in being between man 
and God apart from grace, Barth is emphatic that Christian interpretation 
requires other intellectual bases today than those of the traditional meta- 
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physics. He is not a theological nominalist and explicitly allows that philo- 
sophical terms may be used in a context of faith, but this can be only from 
the premise of revelation. Within the limits of his own position, Barth is 
quite consistent and even rationalistic. Essentially, he asks, why attempt 
knowledge from below when there is a clear word from above? In Barth's 
view, analogy has its basis in the decision of God and man, not as equals but 
unequals. It is possible only as the believer is united with Christ through a 
free decision of God in faith which also evokes human decision. Analogy 
stands at the limit between man and God, denoting similarity in dissimilarity. 
Barth criticizes specifically the First Vatican Council claim that the exis- 
tence of God can be proved by reason alone, charging that it depends on a 
mistaken separation of God the creator from God the reconciler and re- 
deemer. Jesus Christ alone must be our reference in the knowledge of God,lt 
Barth insists that God's creative action in his Word is primary. God is the 
wholly other, not because he is an unknown object. Rather, he is hidden 
even as he is disclosed in his revelation. Barth's view resembles the Platonic 
to the extent of claiming that God is outside of essence. We do  not know 
God the creator independent of his Word and action. In short, there is no 
autonomous knowledge of deity from creation, but only knowledge of the 
Trinitarian God from his special revelation. Barth agrees with Aquinas that 
God is not known immediately but only indirectly. Yet Barth rejects the 
scholastic antithesis between essence and existence as irrelevant for out  
knowledge of God. He takes his clue from Luther: we do not know God 
naked in his nature, but only from his works. Barth believes that claims for 
natural theology have led to confusion about the proper importance of 
theology; it is linked to work righteousness. He holds that traditional 
natural-supernatural distinctions often mask naturalism. 
4. Specific Analogy Designarion in Bal-th's Theology 
Pohlmann examined some two hundred and twenty cases in Barth's 
writings and concluded that more than half represent an extrinsic analogy 
of proportionality.12 Even though this is an analogy of inequality, Barth 
describes it in terms of proportion rather than proportionality. Indeed, 
Pohlmann finds that he does not distinguish between the two. Pohlmann 
concludes that Barth does not use the idea of analogy to describe a relation 
between relations as in classical description. Man and not God is the analo- 
gate. Barth proceeds to equate words of likeness, reflection, and paraIlel, 
using such terms as father, patience, mind, wisdom, spirit, and lordship. 
According to Barth, analogy cannot be developed on the pattern of creator: 
creation = God: world. We may not proceed as in natural theology from a 
likeness in the world itself. Analogy means instead that God appropriates 
and uses an analogon from creation; creation is not the bearer of an inherent 
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power. Truth is not first and primarily in human thought and speech. Love, 
community, sonship, and right must be known from Christ. 
Barth cites as example of Biblical analogy the parallels of father and child, 
king and people, lord and servant. I3  Genesis 1 :22 is used as Biblical reference. 
Analogy is from above and not dependent on human reflection, but on 
God's creative act and being. This claim is very clear in Barth's treatment of 
causality. God and creation are not comparable causes. When we speak of 
God as cause, Barth urges, it must be with the understanding that God is the 
ground and beginning of a11 causal series, causa sui and sui generis. Creation 
has a double relation. It is subject to the divine causality and also has its 
own causal sequences. Barth's primary reference is faith and covenant rather 
than cosmology. He develops his own positive interpretation in a many- 
sided way. In a Christocentric, actualistic context we may say GG:MM, 
GM:MM, GM:MG. As God is to God in the Trinity, a monopluralism, so 
man is to man. As God is to man, man is to  man. As God is to man, man is 
to God. The one pure mirror of God is Jesus Christ and this alone allows us 
to speak positively of analogy. Barth's premise is that only God can make 
the image of himself, and he does so in man. The image is from grace, a task, 
hope, and historical dynamic. We may not speak of the image of God either 
in terms of intellect or in terms of the soul. Yet man is a social being who 
can be taken as God's partner in an image of grace. But it is God who builds 
this community. Barth is emphatic that no all-inclusive concept follows 
from this fact. Reflection does not lead us to the exempIar. It is God alone 
who brings potentiality. 
Barth refuses to allow any intrinsic image of God in man, either formal or 
material, and concludes that the knowledge of God can be given only in 
f a ~ t h  as a new created fact. The natural and historical are seen in relation as 
it is understood that Jesus Christ is the fulfillment of the covenant. Barth is 
explicit that the latter isalways other than God wills, different from its ground 
in Jesus Christ. God is the subject of the history of the covenant, not out of 
nature but as he creates a new man. God repeats in man a relation in himself, 
1 and Thou. Man is an I-Thou from God who is also I-Thou. Man is 
anchored in his creative ground through the covenant. Barth cites the man- 
woman relation, created by God, as the image and model for the history of 
covenant and salvation. However, we must be very clear that it is Jesus 
Christ who shows what the image of God means. I-Thou has its proper 
identity in him alone. We may speak of analogy in terms of Father to  Son, 
Son to Father, and God to  man. Barth cites Jesus' prayer recorded in 
John's Gospel that the Father will glorify his followers with the glory that 
has been given the Son. Barth's references are diverse. He speaks of an 
analogy of heaven and earth. Like Przywara, he uses the figure of marriage. 
He even includes an anaIogy of nothingness (Nichtigkeit); the Satanic can 
function only with the power of God. Man's life is characterized by a holy 
ANALOGY AND THE KNOWLEDGE O F  GOD 77 
unrest. He finds that the history of the world and the history of salvation 
are in restless tension with each other. The world is a "showplace of the 
divine" even though there is an infinite qualitative difference between the 
two. It bears a likeness t o  God even though not in him or a part of him. The 
Calvinistic doctrine of the exclusive glory of God seems to have influenced 
Barth's thought at this point. 
5. Criticism 
Critics point out that Barth does not consider in detail the differences 
between the various schools of analogy interpretation. Clarification of the 
concept of analogy involves epistemological problems which are not en- 
compassed simply by affirmation of faith alone. Barth's Roman Catholic 
critics continue to charge that he fails to recognize the difference between 
false and incomplete knowledge. Their distinction between natural and 
supernatural does not inevitably lead to partitioning of God's being. Our 
natural knowledge of God can be authentic even though not exhaustive. It 
is the basic relation between nature and grace which is under discussion 
in the question of theological analogy, and Barth's emphasis carries its 
own peculiar limitation. Most Protestant theologians have not accepted 
Barth's rejection of religious experience and all natural knowledge of God 
without qualification. For example, the Dutch Protestant theologian, G. C. 
Berkouwer, has described Barth's theological approach as "the triumph of 
grace."lJ However, Berkouwer distinguishes between general revelation and 
natural theology, accepting the former but rejecting the latter. The question 
is not whether particular theologies, notably scholasticism, have confused 
Christian faith claims even in attempting their philosophical defense. It is 
from the perspective of this context that a historical or rational claim about 
God's existence is to be evaluated. Inevitably, Barth's critics, Roman Catho- 
lics and Protestants, continue to ask how God's self-disclosure is to be 
understood. Barth's Christomonism, they have charged, does not allow for 
the variety of Biblical claims about our knowledge of God, much less discus- 
sion of their truth, but is only an affirmation of the centrality of revelation. 
This premise is accepted by all Christians, Analogy concerns not simply 
"that" but "how," the mode. 
Emil Brunner's controversy with Barth was prolonged, often sharp and 
outspoken. He rejected Barth's substitution of the analogy of faith for the 
analogy of being, calling it unique in the history of Christian theology. 
Brunner insists that there is no place for analogy apart from some inner 
relation of man and God. Some correspondence of being is necessary to 
analogy, he argues. Barth has reacted against a rationalistic and naturalistic 
theology, but his nominalism is not legitimate. R. Prenter agrees with 
Brunner that Barth is not really free of the analogy of being.'s Brunner 
remarks that Barth's sharp "Nein" against him was in effect taken back in 
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much of what Barth said in his new doctrine of creation. Inevitably, theo- 
logical concepts must come from the world. Pannenberg makes strong 
statements in his criticism of analogy, even though he is sympathetic to 
Barth. He criticizes the encounter character of Barth's extrinsic attribution, 
concluding that a dynamism and actualism yield no real analogy. Pannen- 
berg charges that Barth demolished the ontological structure of analogy, 
breaking the analogy concept. Taken out of the objective sphere, analogy 
is meaningless. 
The three volume study of Barth's thought written by the French Jesuit, 
Henri Bouillard, includes an important critique on analogy.16 Bouillard 
points out that the extended use of the analogy of being as a defense against 
skepticism and rationalism in the modernist controversy gave it an enlarged 
scope. He denies any fundamental connection between the natural theology 
of his Church and the natural theology against which Barth protested in his 
early period. Roman Catholicism refuses the a priori knowledge of God 
claimed in some Protestant liberalism, Nonetheless, it insists that the natural 
knowledge of God is a condition of faith. The Roman Catholic position is 
not that we know a priori what God is, but only that there is a rational 
moment in faith. Such natural knowledge is not an independent moment, 
although to be sure it is a second one. Bouillard charges that Barth often 
confuses problems of knowledge with questions of salvation. However, 
Barth really does not offer an alternative view of analogy. His terminology 
is not well defined and a t  times he uses analogy to signify even a spatial 
representation of the essence of God's being. Bouillard emphasizes that 
analogy does not have as uniform a definition among Roman Catholics as 
Barth supposes. 
After Barth made rejection of Roman Catholic natural theoIogy the 
dividing line between the Roman Catholic and Protestant positions, Hans 
Urs von Balthasar replied that his Church's tradition does not conceive of 
nature apart from grace. Von Balthasar argued that a distinction between 
philosophy and theology is fundamental at  only two points: affirmation of 
a limited natural knowledge of God apart from special revelation and the 
relevance of metaphysics in explication of revelation itself. In a carefuI study 
von Balthasar argues that Barth's early dialectical perspective was replaced 
by an analogy view throughout the later volumes of the Dogmatics. 
The substitutton of analogy for the principle of dialectic does not occur abruptly I t  can- 
not be grasped in a determ~ned text; it 1s reallzed progressively and insensibly in the first 
volumes of the Krrdllrche Dogmairk, and can be considered as finished In the third vol- 
ume (Die Lehre von Gorr, 1940) and in the works which are its contemporaries (Credo, 
1935, Goiieserkennrn~s und Gor~esciiensr, 1938). The second volume (1938) examlnes 115 
princ~ples w~thout  aking the occasion to develop them. The doctr~ne of analogy will un- 
fold in an ever more man~fest fashion from volume to volume in such a way as to become 
the central theme of the treatises devoted to creation (1945), t o  man (1948) and to pre- 
destination (1950). Whoever does not take t h ~ s  development into account will search in 
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valn in the f ~ r s t  volume of the Klrcl~lrche Dogmatrk (1932) for a precise formulation of 
this doctrine.17 
The question is, what kind of analogy? Von Balthasar even claimed that 
Barth's analogy of faith is in principle dependent on an analogy of being, a 
view that Barth did not accept. Von Balthasar, learning from Przywara, 
does not interpret nature and grace in terms of different levels of meta- 
physical addition and subtraction. His Christocentric theology is charac- 
terized by an actualism and concern for the singular. With Przywara, he 
speaks of one factual order of grace with different moments of creation, the 
fall and redemption. From von Balthasar's point of view, there is no purely 
theoretical knowledge. The natural side of the knowledge of God rests on 
(eingebettet) the supernatural. Von Balthasar argues that the First Vatican 
Council decree on the natural knowledge of God applies only to nature as 
defined theologically. In criticism of Barth, he insists that nature is not 
cursed. Rather, it is elevated, empowered and fulfilled in grace. Even in 
original sin, man is never without supernatural help. Sin represents a con- 
tradiction of the creation against the creator. Von Balthasar takes his 
orientation from the Council of Chalcedon. He speaks of a concrete essence 
which is natural-supernatural. In Christ, he argues, supernature appeared 
in the form of kenosis. God has revealed his inner life. 
Defense of the analogy of being has not come from Roman Catholics 
alone. H. G. Pohlmann, a Lutheran, charges that Barth's position is a 
panactualism. Barth regards God as totally act and not substance. Pohlmann 
concludes that Barth's attempt to abolish the distinction between substance 
and accident, the actual and potential, is unsuccessful. He argues that Barth's 
actualism leads to equivocation; theologically, Christomonism follows from 
this one-sided view. Barth believes that act means being and being alone can 
be in act. God is himself only in his divine act. Hence, analogy can be neither 
ontic, substantial, nor inherent. All static systems are excluded in Barth's 
analogia relationis. Pohlmann points out that in the later volumes of the 
Church Dogmatics, the alternative is no longer between faith and being as 
much as between subsistent and actual being. He urges that the BiblicaI out- 
look, unlike that of Barth, is statico-dynamic; it teaches that reality endures. 
Being has a double character, according to the Biblical writers. In their 
view, it "happens" and "exists." The Old Testament describes the cosmos in 
static terms: earth and heaven remain firm. The status and limits of the self 
are fixed. Our heart is to hold fast in trust in a God who abides. Pohlmann 
argues further that the language of the New Testament does not have to do 
simply with action, but includes a static element. Constancy is presupposed 
in distinguishing between God and creation. 
Pohlrnann finds that being manifests itself in act and potency, not just in 
one or the other. He criticizes Barth's actuaIism on the grounds that accidents 
and substance belong inevitably to our experience. He holds that substance 
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need not be viewed as simply material or self-contained. Recognition of this 
fact, he believes, enables us to avoid a simply spiritualistic or materialistic 
monism. Pohlmann believes that an  intrinsic analogy structure enables us 
to understand God's Word. He argues that only the material image of God 
was destroyed by the fall, citing Genesis 5:1 and 9:6, together with I Corin- 
thians 1 1:7 and Matthew 22:20, in defense of inzago firnzalus in post- 
Lapsarian man. T o  allow a limited natural theology in this context is not to 
accept the Roman Catholic claim that the formal and material image of 
God remains intact together. Pohlmann cites Bonhoeffer's conviction that 
God is not bound by his world, but has bound himself to it in his covenant. 
Man can forsake God's Word but God's Word will not leave him. Barth 
rightly argues that God's act roots in his being. However, he then isolates the 
divine Word from creation docetically. Barth's refusal of any concept of 
nature leads to a false eitherlor. One must choose between sin and God. 
This strategy leads to confusion in ethics. For  example, the state is made an 
order of grace under the kingdom of God o r  Antichrist rather than being 
allowed a more neutral position. A doctrine of creation must make clear that 
God's relation to the world is not simply one of wrath. Pohlmann urges that 
Barth carries anti-abstraction too far in denial that Biblical religion deals 
with the universal as well as the concrete. Barth's actualism in the analogy of 
faith does avoid creating a second center beside grace in the pope, doctrines 
or ecclesiology. However, Pohlmann will not concede that every analogy of 
being necessarity leads to  this impasse o r  is without concern for sin. Unable 
to  derive any knowledge of transcendence from the world of creation, Barth 
speaks of an  infinite qualitative difference. Pohlmann replies that the Bible 
teaches that the substance of creation is good and not just an accident of 
grace. Biblical writers comment repeatedly on the way in which the world 
reflects God's glory and compare him with light and fire. Such a symbolism 
appears especially in the Fourth Gospel. Basically, however, it is man rather 
than the world which is the image of God. On  this premise, the Bible allows 
a legitimate analogy with the non-Christian religions. Although Pohlmann 
bases his comments on Biblical exegesis, he raises a number of philosophical 
questions. He does not treat the more inclusive problem of the metaphysics 
of theism; indeed, he wishes to avoid such a perspective. He does not raise 
the question of the relation of nature and grace directly, but it is clear that 
he presupposes a Lutheran as against a Roman Catholic position. Nonethe- 
less, it is significant that he believes 'that a limited analogy of being is possible 
and indeed necessary in such a context. 
Sohngen has offered a n  alternative to  the positions of Przywara and 
Barth.18 He defines analogy as a method of interpretation which gives 
knowledge through likeness. Conscious of Protestant criticism, Sohngen 
attempts to identify the analogy of faith more exactly as a hermeneutical 
principle. The analogy of faith shows the unity in  the different orders of 
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religious knowledge. It makes explicit: 1. the unity of meaning in scripture, 
2. the unity of scripture with the Church's doctrinal teaching, 3. the unity 
and interreIation of the mysteries of faith, 4. the unity of nature with obedi- 
ence to grace and faith. Sohngen emphasizes that the language of the Bible 
is not metaphysical like that of Plato, Aristotle, Leibnitz, or Hegel. Instead, 
it uses the more dynamic analogia metaphorica. Sohngen warns that we 
must be careful not to attempt to purify Biblical language from philosophy, 
exchanging theology for metaphysics. He finds no direct relation between 
the analogy of faith and the analogy of being in the constitution of likeness. 
He is explicit that the analogy of being as metaphysical-ontological neces- 
sarily fails to reach deity. It is only through revelation and faith that man is 
raised up and made into likeness of God. Faith is likeness to the inner divine 
life. Analogy is real alone through the work of God. The problem is not one 
of a universal concept, but how we understand sin, revelation, grace, and 
redemption in terms of passages such as Romans I:20. The priority which 
Sohngen gives to faith may be illustrated from the analogy of Heavenly 
Father. He believes that the Word of God, not nominal being, declares man 
a real child of God, introducing him to participation in the divine life. 
Sohngen's stance is not abstractly speculative but moral. He appraises 
nature from the history of salvation rather than metaphysics. Analogy in 
his view moves between the act of God in salvation and the concrete essence 
of man. Man, although made in the image of God, is now sinner by nature; 
he can no longer see God's likeness which is written in creation. The analogy 
of faith is possible because God comes out of himself to man. Sohngen 
argues that I Corinthians 2: 1 1 - 13, Philippians 2:6, 7, and John 1: 14 refer t o  
the analogy of faith and not the analogy of being. He develops his positive 
interpretation of anaIogy from a doctrine of creation. All human names 
ultimately are from God who made the world. Man is limited as a worldly 
essence; it is God who calls and names. Human existence is perfected in 
communication with God's essence and reality. The names which we apply 
to deity analogically do not mean that he is contained in them; instead, they 
put us in relation to him. 
Sohngen finds a reciprocal relation between the Greek static and Hebrew- 
Christian dynamic view. Whereas the analogia metaphysics is purely con- 
ceptual, the analogia metaphorica is imageful. The latter gives depth and 
fullness which would otherwise remain lacking in pure conceptuality. Scrip- 
ture and faith give us new understanding of nature through grace. Both 
references are necessary; nature and grace receive new insight and clarifica- 
tion from each other. God's Word of likeness mediates between the mystery 
of the hidden deity and the pardoned, grace-receiving man. Sohngen insists 
that nature has an ontoIogical relation to God and speaks of an assimilation 
of God's Word to man and his word. He distinguishes two movements, one 
from above to below and another from below to above. Direction of move- 
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ment is of fundamental importance in appraising analogy. Although God's 
Word comes in human speech forms, it is God who makes the likeness. The 
images and concepts of the created world of the analogy of being are used in 
the analogy of faith. It is not as God but as man that Jesus Christ is the last 
and highest likeness, the one mediator between God and man. Sohngen 
urges that the God of creation and salvation has metaphysical relevance. The 
analogia metaphorica gives the analogia rnetaphysica its fullness of meaning. 
He distinguishes mode and form, rnodus significandi and res signifi:cata in 
theological concepts. 
Sohngen's interpretation like that of Przywara draws on Augustine as 
well as Aristotle and Aquinas together with Newman. An emphasis from 
Bonaventura is also important. Citing Anselm, Sohngen describes the 
analogy of being as healed through grace by a higher likeness in the analogy 
of faith. He points out that it was Plato who first called attention to the 
relation between participation and analogy. However, according to Sohngen, 
philosophy proceeds from the ens commune and knows no participation in 
the divine nature. It is only as the participation of faith is added to the parti- 
cipation of being through redemption that man shares and participates in the 
divine life. Aquinas's analogy expresses an order of rank as well as the causal 
relation of dependence. The language of primus analogatus and analogata 
inferiori is used to express dependence, as being is communicated from God. 
Barth, holding to Luther's sirnil iustus et peccator, finds an antithesis be- 
tween the two. Barth has praised Sohngen's emphasis on the analogy of 
faith. However, as Walker has pointed out, the Neo-scholastic understand- 
ing of the relation of nature and grace remains in principle. The analogy of 
being is prolegomena to revelation in a kind of natural theology. Sohngen 
emphasizes the remaining natural image of God after the fa11 as against 
Brunner. The analogy of faith is not set against the analogy of being but 
builds on it. The created order is healed and clarified through Jesus Christ. 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
1. The Ecumenical Debate 
A study of the analogia entis-analogia fidei debate cannot avoid the 
question of the contemporary status of the analogy problem. Indeed, the 
question has been implicit throughout this writing. There have been two 
kinds of significant study of analogy in the period following the second world 
war. One has been primarily historical, and appears in the so-caHed renais- 
sance of research on this theme in St. Thomas.' The other has used historical 
studies as data in a more far-reaching reappraisal. Puntel's unusually incisive 
and comprehensive volume is an example of the second type. Added to 
Roman Catholic reinterpretation and research is the work of such Angli- 
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cans as Casserley, Farrer, and Mascall, as well as philosophers of religion 
such as Ramsey and Woods. It is important that Roman Catholic writers are 
engaging in theological and not just philosophical dialogue about analogy. 
Moreover, it is now evident that Protestant philosophical interest was not 
destroyed by Barthianism, and that concern for the meaning of religious 
experience in general continues. The widespread interest in hermeneutic has 
raised questions about epistemology as well as kerygma. Earlier in this study, 
attention was called to the similarities between this interest and analogical 
interpretation, One contribution of hermeneutic has been to emphasize that 
religious language must be used precisely and with a careful choice of context. 
The textbook exposition, against which the theologians of the Second 
Vatican Council have polemicized in many different areas, assuredly does 
not exhaust the meaning of analogy. An Aristotelian substance-accident 
metaphysics is of only limited value for the exposition of our theme in a 
context of Protestant dialectical theology as well as post-Kantian philosophy 
in general. Puntel points out that a number of questions must be considered 
in attempts at reconstruction:2 Is analogy anything more than an analogy 
of names in Aquinas's writings? Had he reaIly thought through the question 
of ontological difference in relation to God and the world? What, for ex- 
ample, is the relation between analogy and being? Aquinas concludes each 
of his proofs, in effect, by stating that "this is what all men understand by the 
term God." Assuredly, a host of questions in the history of religions is begged 
in such an omnibus statement. 
A basic watershed in the interpretation of analogy appears in the debate 
as to whether it is primariIy an epistemological reference. Bouillard has 
argued convincingly that in Aquinas's exposition it is a mode of judgment 
rather than an ontological concept.3 The later scholastic schools gave it a 
conceptual reference that  Aquinas never intended. Of course, Neo- 
scholasticism has made it primary in the predication of the divine attributes.4 
Evidently enough, Przywara's treatment extended the theme far beyond this 
usage, developing it as a principle of structure in metaphysics. To justify his 
point of view, he surveyed its larger historical setting and significance. 
Przywara did not limit himself to defining its meaning in one type of philos- 
ophy or theology done. Rather, he employed it to defend the metaphysics 
of theism as well as to justify a particular type of theological expression. Not 
exclusively Thomistic, Przywara was sensitive to  the philosophical trends 
of the time, trying to appraise their intention positively and not just nega- 
t i ~ e l y . ~  Inevitably, such an outlook joined epistemological and metaphysical 
concern. Przywara pressed further to specifically religious themes, attempt- 
ing to explicate them philosophically. Analogy gave him a stance at the 
meeting place of philosophy and theology with an inclusive orientation in 
both. 
If Przywara's contribution was to  give the idea of analogy a wider refer- 
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ence, expanding it beyond school controversies, Barth's service was to put 
it in a radically theological context. In Barth's interpretation, it had to do 
with faith and not speculation. In what seemed to his critics a one-sided 
emphasis, he introduced a new dimension into the discussion of its meaning, 
one that has been reflected in Roman Catholic reinterpretation. Not only 
did Barth use post-scholastic philosophical categories; he was highly critical 
of any dependence on them apart from the radical priority of faith. The 
analogy of faith long had been used as a principle for relating and harmon- 
izing different doctrines. Barth gave it a new meaning by going to the root 
issue in any Christian knowledge of God: speculation can be idolatrous. His 
rejection of all syntheses of nature and grace drove those who chalIenged him 
back to their own confessional premises, requiring them to disclose their pri- 
mary presuppositions. Faith, Barth insisted, is not just mystical knowledge. 
It is the sin-grace and not the nature-supernature antithesis which belongs 
to the Bible. The analogy of faith does not describe the knowledge of God 
in general, but Christian truth. Knowledge is determined from the categories 
of Christian faith and not other meanings which are alien or extrinsic to it. 
Przywara argued that consideration of the theme of analogy raises the 
problem of the relation between philosophy and theology. Puntel urges that 
Przywara's approach is unique: he has attempted to think through the 
entire history of Western thought with analogy as its dynamic structural 
principIe.6 For Przywara, analogy is not just one theme among others, but 
the often unexpressed presupposition of the synthesis of Greek and Hebrew 
perspectives in the Christian metaphysics of theism. Puntel is emphatic that 
Przywara's analysis does not stand alone. The German Catholic philosophy 
of recent decades would have been impossible without his reflection and 
leadership.' The exchanges between Barth and Przywara, in effect, by- 
passed the long legacy of school distinctions between different types of 
analogy. These distinctions along with questions of causality and proofs of 
God's existence became of secondary importance. Przywara himself was not 
interested in the detailed reconstruction of Aquinas's position or in forcing 
his thought into exact conformity with it. Of course, one can ask whether 
justice can be done to the issues when the traditional apparatus of analogi- 
cal predication is ignored. 
2. Contemporary Relevance 
Przywara argued that the very nature of Christian theological doctrines, 
incarnation and grace as well as creation and providence, makes analogy 
indispensable to theistic interpretation. Simply in terms of the history of 
ideas, it is quite impossible to avoid the Greek philosophical categories in 
which the concept was explicated, no matter how they are evaluated. Of 
course, today the question of religious knowledge is treated differently in a 
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wide variety of contexts, ranging from language analysis to existential 
explication of kerygma. Przywara used analogy to clarify what he regarded 
as the perennial role of metaphysics in theology. To  be sure, acknowledg- 
ment of this orientation is only the beginning and not the end of evaluation. 
One must ask not simply of its definition but its usage. The complexity of 
the issue, however, need not obscure its perennial character. Theology 
requires that the Word of God have clear articulation in concept. The 
subtlety and many-sidedness of metaphysical explanation can be missed all 
too easily in kerygmatic statement. In the longer view, Przywara argued, the 
dominant philosophical ethos does affect religion as well as vice versa. For 
his own part, he did not deny a theological reference in philosophy, implicit 
if not evident from the outset. Yet the fact of religion need not destroy the 
integrity of philosophy, and epistemology is not irrelevant to theology, as 
Barth supposed. 
Analogy becomes of contemporary relevance in the debate as to whether 
there can be a simply existential interpretation, either in phiIosophy or 
theology. Both Barth and Przywara use existential themes in their formula- 
tion. Although Przywara has an Augustinian sense of mystical encounter, 
he does not allow it to stand alone. His question is whether it is possible to  
ignore all form or essence, and he argues that this reference returns in spite 
of all attempts to avoid it. Analogy in his view joins essence and existence, 
but not in a simply secular context. Przywara's later works develop a sugges- 
tive phenomenology of religion in general, premised on the Catholic doctrine 
of the natural knowledge of God. In a very different way from Barth, he 
drove his opponents back to their religious presuppositions. Przywara finds 
continuity, not just discontinuity, between philosophy and theology. He 
attempts to speak of God from the creator-creation relation, developing a 
perspective which joins them metaphysically. In the scholastic period, 
analogy was formulated in terms of natural theology as well as dogmatics. It 
is dubious whether or not Roman Catholicism ever embraced the fully 
autonomous natural theology which has been ascribed to it in some con- 
temporary discussion.8 If one accepts the scholastic apparatus without 
modification, it can be used as the basis for theological synthesis. It is only 
when the first premises of this synthesis are challenged that the question 
arises as to the negotiability of such a description. 
Barth called attention in a dramatic way to the faith-reason problem. 
However, the question remains as to the extent to which analogy is a legiti- 
mate reference in a phenomenology of religion. As developed by Przywara 
against Barth, the analogy of being was based on religious life and practice 
as they join reflection. Breton describes it as the essence of the mystical 
e~per ience .~  One of the aspects of Barth's analysis, now challenged radically, 
is his rejection of a11 religion as idolatrous. His analysis, aIthough powerful 
in argument and polemic, was restrictive. 
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Religion, like metaphysics, is many-sided and perennial. Barth's total 
rejection of both of these references oversimplified the problem of language 
as well as being. No doubt any attempt to reconstruct the metaphysics of 
theism must take place in the midst of a variety of conflicting epistemologies. 
Yet the critique of earlier substantialist doctrines does not necessarily leave 
only an existential or pragmatic alternative. The question is not simply one 
of a return to a pre-Kantian view, much less the intellectual deduction of the 
attributes of God apart from religious experience. Rather the issue revolves 
around the question of whether finite being is as closed in on itself as much 
of contemporary existentialism has supposed. Is there little more which 
remains than a leap of faith in response to revelation? Must one not ask 
about the relation of time and eternity, the one and the many, essence and 
existence, as Przywara has maintained? To be sure, it is easy enough to show 
that analogies have been important in the history of religion and theology. 
The further question concerns itself with the existential reference which will 
be used in controlling them. This was the crucial issue in the Przywara- 
Barth debate. For the Protestant, Roman Catholic speculation was in danger 
of reducing grace to nature. 
We have noted that Przywara's thought took a new direction following 
the second world war. Philosophical synthesis seemed broken; earlier hopes 
for a new Catholic intellectualism in Germany had come to naught. His new 
outlook even left a place for a theologia crucis. Bernhard Gertz has written 
an extended study of Przywara's later thought after extensive personal con- 
sultation with him.10 Gertz claims that the analogy of faith, a theme virtually 
ignored by Przywara before the war, became more and more the center of 
his reflection. It is this type of analogy more than the analogy of being which 
determines and directs Przywara's later writings. Assuredly, his categoriza- 
tion became increasingly more dogmatic and mystical. Przywara formulated 
an extensive typology of the old and new covenants, finding discontinuity 
between the two and developing the analogy of faith from the latter. Analogy 
denotes substantial revelation in the incarnation, which is known symboli- 
cally and even mythically. Earlier, Przywara had attempted to evaluate a 
variety of perspectives from the point of view of the philosophia perennis. 
Later, he viewed the totality of philosophy almost entirely from the point of 
view of Catholic theology.ll 
3. Karl Rahner's Roman Catholic Reinterpretation 
Both Kiihn and Puntel point out that Przywara's earlier interests have not 
been without influence in the post-war era." The Jesuit Karl Rahner has 
been one of the leading Roman Catholic theologians in the era of the Second 
Vatican Council. The philosophical reinterpretation of analogy, initiated by 
Przywara, continues in his writings, to be sure with major differences and 
modification.13 Rahner's exposition uses Kant's emphasis on the subjective 
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forms of understanding and joins it to Heidegger's appreciation of the 
historicity of being.14 He comments that the modern period is one of the 
subject, but need not be one of subjectivism. Contemporary theology must 
speak to man and notjust of deity in isolation from the creature. Yet Rahner's 
approach is not simply existential, much less from a theory of knowledge 
alone, although it includes both dimensions. In principle, it appropriates the 
classical Catholic tradition of metaphysics, but with a more radical sense of 
history than the schoIastics. Rahner does not reject Aristotle's description of 
man as a rational animal overtly; however, he believes that it tells too little. 
Time belongs to the essence of man; the unity of experience is in his subjec- 
tivity rather than in an abstract scientific ideal.15 
Rahner finds that nature was interpreted too much from things and not 
enough from personal being in the last century as well as in antiquity. The 
Greek concept of nature is sub-human; taken alone, it reduces man to a 
thing. Too often, it has been appropriated uncritically in Christian reflection, 
he argues. Human nature is not to be found in any concretely experienceable 
essence which appears before our eyes. Contemporary existentialism has 
emphasized again that man's nature is never fully concrete in his existence. 
Rahner criticizes the rigid traditional distinction between nature and grace, 
even as he argues the impossibility of drawing a sharp line between the 
two.16 The intent of his reconstruction is clear as he holds that no single 
philosophical category, modern or scholastic, can be taken over without 
modification. Thus faith claims become relevant to a doctrine of analogy. 
Rahner's doctrine of a supernatural existenfelle makes explicit its theological 
basis. Why the introduction of the concept of nature if man's being is ful- 
filled in its deepest character by God alone? Rahner replies that the concept 
of nature helps to make clear that grace is a free gift. In the supernatural life, 
we must accept God's communication as wholly gratuitous. Man's essence 
is not closed in on itself. Rather,it ispotentia obcedientialis to  revelation; this 
is the basic meaning of the analogy of being." 
Rahner, like Barth, attempts to overcome merely static theological cate- 
gories. However, his approach is a different one. He rejects a simply fideistic 
view of revelation on the one hand and a merely natural religion on the other. 
Rahner's view of spirit works against both. Only a relation to God can fulfil1 
man's deepest needs. Rahner does not suppose that God is a fact immediately 
given in experience or just another subject. These alternatives are precluded 
by analogical description which at the same time makes explicit the relation 
between the human spirit and the divine spirit. God supports the world, 
working in and through it even as he is ultimately beyond it. The very nature 
of the human spirit is self-transcendence, Rahner argues. It projects beyond 
itself. Yet it cannot recognize itself for what it is without positing an absolute 
and unlimited unity of being and knowing as actually existent. Absolute 
being should not be interpreted simply as a self-relating totality, but as 
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dynamic moving power. The primeval unity and source of being and knowl- 
edge is in spirit. 
Rahner agreed with Przywara that the analogy of being is the hallmark of 
Roman Catholic reflection and devotion. Yet his appropriation of the ideas 
of Heidegger as well as the new French theology is much larger than in the 
case of Przywara. Rahner conceives of metaphysics as existential reflection 
about being rather than any self-complete definition of essences. He speaks 
in terms of "having being" (Seinhaben) in order to avoid abstraction. 
"Having being" belongs principally to God alone in his unity of essence and 
existence. God is not known merely as an object but as concrete transcen- 
dence. For both Przywara and Rahner, analogy explains the motivation and 
direction of human thought. Each emphasizes excessus more than negation 
or comparison. Their interpretation is more open and indefinite than that of 
Neo-scholasticism. Rahner accepts Martchal's appropriation of the Kantian 
critique of knowledge, one that was rejected by Przywara. More than this, 
Rahner begins theology as well as philosophy from his anthropology. Yet 
he retains Roman Catholic school distinctions more than Przywara. 
Rahner's position is related to Henri de Lubac's Supernatural, an impor- 
tant study of the new French theology which appeared in 1946. De Lubac, a 
felIow Jesuit, attacked the extrinsicism of grace together with a static and 
self-complete view of nature which he found dominant in Neo-scholasticism. 
Rahner has argued strongly, supporting this criticism in his own interpreta- 
tion. However, de Lubac also held that the desire for the beatific vision 
belongs intrinsically to the human person. His critics replied that grace 
could not be really gratuitous in this view. Rahner rejected de Lubac's 
formulation, urging that man's concrete essence and not his nature is directed 
to the vision of God in a supernatural existentelle. The transcendental opens 
"over-out" to the transcendent. The human persofi seeks to affirm his own 
being in relation to absolute and perfect being. Ultimately, fulfillment is 
possible only through grace. 
A number of new emphases appear in Rahner's later writings. He has 
given special attention to  the doctrine of the Trinity.18 In most of classical 
theology, God is described as one and the creation as plural. Analogy is built 
upon this dualism. The Trinitarian God, however, Rahner explains, is both 
one and many. God is not just a static unity, nor are the divine attributes to 
be predicated only in terms of his simplicity. Spirit in man as in God is many- 
sided. Of course, it is the Thomistic premise that will follows and is governed 
by intellect. Other interpretations of analogy are more voluntaristically 
oriented as in Protestant Reformation theology. Walter Kern, a German 
Jesuit, commenting on Rahner's interpretation, points out that both intellect 
and will belong to spirit.19 They have all too easily been applied to God 
abstractly and without historical reference. Rahner's sense of the tension 
between these two explains part of his emphasis on history. To  be sure, 
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Rahner has not been without his critics among Roman Catholics. Bernhard 
Lakebrink argues that Rahner has broken with the realism of the Platonic- 
Aristotelian tradition.20 Being has become a question rather than a reality in 
a new subjectivism. Analogy is no longer used for inclusive metaphysical 
formulation, but only theological affirmation. Lakebrink classifies Rahner 
and Barth together as Neo-Kantian. Przywara probably would agree a t  least 
in part, since he rejected Markchal's approach outspokenly. Yet his cate- 
gories, like those of Rahner, are more theological than philosophical. 
4. Protestant Reinterpretation: Pannenberg, Ott, Tillich, Brunner 
It is evident that differing anthropological premises underlie particular 
confessional interpretations.21 Thomism explains the fall of man in terms of 
the loss of preternatural gifts. Human nature, especially reason, is believed 
to be still intact even though weakened and imbalanced, The fulfiIlment of 
nature in grace remains possible. Reformation theologians in contrast have 
described the fall as a more radical corruption. Human nature is perverted 
if not destroyed, and must be reconstructed, not simply fulfilled in grace. 
They argue that the Biblical doctrine is not one of the harmony of nature 
and grace, but the antithesis of sin and grace. Biblical religion embodies a 
critique of all religion which identifies God with nature; it is oriented toward 
his self-disclosure in history. Any attempt to harmonize nature and grace 
runs the danger of missing the essential character of the Biblical insight. At 
most, the nature-supernature distinction is relatively late in the history of 
theology and of secondary importance. Even Protestants who accept the 
analogy of being admit that it has all too easily mixed belief and unbelief in 
the past, ignoring the abiding tensions between faith and reason. In such 
circumstances, analogy has become a promiscuous omnibus category. 
Speculation and mysticism have been joined in analogical affirmation. Only 
after the limits of the natural knowledge of God are identified can there be 
appropriate consideration of the analogy of faith. 
A part of the difficulty in reconstructing analogy for a Protestant context 
arises from a Protestant emphasis on the doctrine of justification by faith 
alone. One must ask whether this doctrine excludes all metaphysics of 
theism in a contemporary mode. Bultmann even more than Barth has 
answered affirmatively." To  Przywara, the refusal of all substantial meta- 
physics seemed equally as one-sided as the self-contained immanence of an 
agnostic or atheistic existentialism. One was closed to the world, and the 
other to deity. The Protestant Reformers did not reject the analogy of being 
explicitly. This is Barth's original position. Nonetheless, as Aalders points 
out in defending Przywara's view, revelation not reason, grace not nature, 
faith not works were given priority in the Protestant soteriological setting.23 
Aalders argues that the being common to man and God was generalized 
and became secondary to the promise of God to creation in Reformation 
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theology. He concludes that the Reformers' appeal to the judgment of God 
invoked a totally different realm which had nothing in common with the 
order of being. Not esse as such but its quality, bonurn esse, became domi- 
nant. Antithesis and difference received priority. At most, analogy couId 
only express a faith which was completely and directly the work of God. Of 
course, Luther's criticism of Thomistic intellectualism was drastic. However, 
his position assuredly was not a skepticism about the use of language, but 
only a drastic emphasis on the distinction between the role of reason in the 
natural world and with respect to faith.His metaphors at times premise a 
correlation between God's being and that of the creature which invites the 
designation analogia metaphorica.24 Aalders finds that Calvin allowed a 
more explicit place for analogy than Luther; however, the primary context 
continued to be theologica1.?5 Calvin gave priority to the living esse together 
with the will of God, premising a positive relation between the one creating 
and the many created beings. 
A number of alternatives present themselves in the variety of Protestant 
interpretations of analogy. Pannenberg and Schlink both question whether 
analogy can be a legitimate reference in theology.?6 Pannenberg's "Habilita- 
tionschrift" was written on the theme of analogy at the University of Heidel- 
berg. Not only does he challenge the Roman Catholic synthesis of Greek 
and Biblical categories; he questions the vitality of the basic designation of 
analogy as a mean between univocal and equivocal. Pannenberg points out 
that simple definition of analogy as a middle position masks a variety of 
ambiguities. He concludes that an identifiable type of orientation develops 
in theology or metaphysics whenever one accepts this definition. Barth's 
view, he argues, has significant resembIance to Neoplatonism in spite of all 
Barth's attempts to avoid philosophy and mysticism. Only a limited number 
of alternatives is available if one takes the way of analogy. Barth moves from 
negation to affirmation, correlating relations between God and creation 
"from above." 
Advocates of analogy argue that it is perennial in Christian theology- 
whether it is intended or not. Karl Barth's successor at the University of 
Basel, Heinrich Ott, describes it as an "in between" and draws on the ideas 
of Heidegger and Buber in his e x p o ~ i t i o n . ~ ~  God's reality transcends our 
consciousness, yet he cannot be described as simply another object, Ott 
argues. Religious symbols have to do with empirical experience, decision, 
and responsibility. They are not transcategorical, but phenomenological, 
and in Christianity should not be speculative but represent faith in God, Ott 
attempts to clarify the meaning of expressions concerning God's wrath in 
the Old Testament, and he considers the relation between anthropomorphism 
and personality. He concedes that God's wrath cannot be described literally 
in terms of a correspondence with our mood or its effects. 
Ott, like Rahner, attempts reconstruction in terms of an existentelle rather 
ANALOGY AND T H E  KNOWLEDGE O F  GOD 91 
than a classical deduction. The latter, he finds, lacks the basic premise of 
personality. Ott warns against the danger of mixing philosophy and theology 
or of making analogy absolute or even dependent on the Church's teaching 
office as in Aquinas. Ott develops his own view as an exposition of the 
situation of belief, decision, and responsibility before God. In his explana- 
tion, he speaks of an analogy with our relation to our fellowmen. There is 
an "in between" of moral responsibility. Of course, Ott's phenomenology is 
a very imprecise tool; his reference is to faith rather than to being. Walker 
asks whether he is not really dealing simply with fideistic posteriority rather 
than any qualitative difference. In terms of traditional analysis, he appears 
to argue for a univocal logos and specific genus even as he refuses traditional 
distinctions of analogous predication. Ott's exposition makes evident the 
need for Protestant theory to consider the entire historical range of analogy 
interpretation. 
Paul Tillich acknowledged the analogy of being as the basic premise of his 
interpretation. Replying to the American Jesuit, Gustave Weigel, he wrote: 
I speak of analogical knowledge and mean with it exactly what St. Thomas means with 
analogiaentis. The reason I used symbol more than analogy 1s a methodological difference 
between St. Thomas and my~elf .2~ 
At the same time, Tillich explicitly acknowledged his indebtedness t o  Barth's 
dogmatics. In disagreement with Barth, Tillich emphasized the ontological 
context of revelation. Greek and Hebrew thought forms, the problems of 
classical philosophy, and the answer of revelation came together in his 
system. Rheim finds the novelty of Tillich's exposition in its joining of justi- 
fication by faith with the analogy of being. However, the latter is not used in 
a context of the traditional metaphysics of theism. Tillich conceived of the 
relation between faith and reason in more paradoxical terms than the sup- 
porting and complementary mode of Roman Catholicism. 
In illustration of Protestant interpretation based on the analogia entis, the 
ideas of Tillich and Emil Brunner will be compared. Brunner writes: " . . . the 
doctrine of the analogia entis which has been such a controversial topic 
of late, is not peculiar to the Catholic Church, but it has been part of the 
common Christian inheritance of belief from the earliest days of the Church; 
for it simply expresses the fact that it has pleased God so to  create the world 
that in and through it His 'everlasting power and divinity' may be made 
known."29 Brunner argues for general revelation "because the Holy Scrip- 
tures teach it unmistakably."30 It is the witness of the Fathers of the early 
Church and the Reformers. "God gives revelation in order that man may 
know Him, but man turns this into an ilIusion."3' Brunner expresses a 
characteristically Protestant attitude in identifying "the point at which the 
doctrine of the Reformers diverges from that of the Catholic Church, in 
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accordance with their differing views of the sinful corruption of man." They 
emphasized the cognitive significance of sin. Man left alone with knowledge 
of God from the world cannot help misconstruing analogy in a pantheistic 
sense. Brunner believes that the analogy of being does not, in fact, give 
sufficient ground for the construction of a natural theology, "The sinful 
reason always understands this 'likeness' in a wrong way, without perceiving 
the radical 'unlikeness' at  the same time, which is rooted in the fact that God 
alone is God, that He is Creator and Lord."3' 
Brunner's position is that historical revelation and the faith which it 
creates are needed to see the truth of analogies from creation. Yet he is 
emphatic that these analogies d o  not exist because of faith, but only become 
visible to it. Hence the analogy of being cannot be replaced by the analogy 
of faith as Barth holds. The question remains, however, as to whether analogy 
as interpreted by Brunner really has an epistemological value. To  be sure, 
Brunner argues that the analogy of being is a necessary premise of all Chris- 
tian theology. As an analogy of creation, it expresses the illumination of the 
inner eye of man through God's Word. It is not a principle of natural 
theology but of Biblical religion which makes explicit God's revealed essence 
and revelation to man. Walker argues that Brunner's analogy is a broken 
one, at most only with the outer contour of similarity in greater dissimilarity. 
Brunner draws on the ideas of Calvin, who, more than Luther, developed 
a view of the universe as ordered and structured. Man as blinded by sin does 
not recognize the creator's workmanship. It is only as he is restored by faith 
that he comes to the true knowledge of God. Natural theology accepts a 
point of contact between man and God, but does not necessarily imply an 
autonomous understanding apart from faith. Brunner argues that the tran- 
scendence of essence and being have not been clearly distinguished from one 
another. "Transcendence of essence means that God is God alone, and that 
His 'Godhood' is absolutely and irrevocably different from all other forms 
of being."33 However, "transcendence of Being, understood in the absolute 
sense, would mean that God is not immanent in the world in any sense at all 
. . . the statement of extreme Deism." In short, God is immanent in the 
world even though unrecognized by sinful man. Brunner is explicit in his 
opposition to the Roman Catholic analogy of being so far as it is connected 
with Neoplatonic ontology and natural theology. Analogy can be employed 
legitimately only from within historical revelation. The Neoplatonic view 
and its speculative ontological theory of a hierarchy of being mistakenly seek 
to achieve knowledge of God by way of abstraction. 
Tillich finds a more positive relation between classical Greek philosophy 
and BibIical religion. In his commentary, "Some Questions on Brunner's 
Epistemology," he remarks: "It seems to me that the Stoic doctrine in which 
the logos embraces the structure both of mind and reality is nearer to the 
early Christian and even Johannine doctrine than Brunner admits."34 For 
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Tillich, the divine self-manifesting logos through whom the world received 
its structure and meaning is the same one through whom estrangement is 
overcome and the world reunited with God. Tillich does not accept Brunner's 
sharp dichotomy between the Greek philosophical logos and that of the 
incarnation. Presupposing that the logos of man's existence in the world has 
a correlation with the divine disclosed in Jesus Christ, Tillich writes: 
If  the knowledge of revelation is called "analogous," this certa~nty refers to the classical 
doctr~ne of the analogiaentis between the finite and the Infinite. Without such an analogy 
nothing could be s a ~ d  about God.35 
In reply to Father Weigel, Tillich explained further: "I believe you are right 
when you say that my understanding of analogia entis is more negative pro- 
testing than positive-affirming." It was part of his Protestant conviction that 
no single expression of Christian faith is exhaustive or  relevant for all times. 
Symbols achieve power but may also lose it. Cultural modes of understand- 
ing are not timeless. It is in this way that TiIlich's interpretation avoids many 
of the problems of traditional analogical description. 
A part of the difference between Brunner and Tillich lies in the latter's 
more positive attitude toward Neoplatonism. Tillich's use of analogy is very 
general; Ford charges that his concept of being is really univocal, based on 
those properties which are common to all beings. Ford writes: 
Analogia entis can simply mean the semantic fact that in order to speak of that which 
transcends finlte be~ng,  we must use a language which is produced by the encounter with 
f ~ n ~ t e  being. ... Thls is not analogia entis in the mode of traditional theology, but it 1s 
semant~c analysis of the relation of religious language to  other types of language, a task 
requ~red of both analysis ph~losophers and systernatlc  theologian^.'^ 
McLean objects that Tillich allows no intrinsic relation between man and 
God, although to be sure he speaks of participation. McLean charges that 
Tillich's symbols give us no new information concerning God, no additional 
"belief that" but only "belief in."37 We can speak of God in encounter but 
not of the knowledge of God himself. Tillich's answer would seem to be that 
beings can of themselves be symbols of the divine preciseIy because of the 
divine depth dimension within them. The affirmative element in the analogy 
is the divine itself, but this must be valued in a mystical sense. 
5. Confessional DgJerences 
In perspective, it is clear that the Przywara-Barth debate treated only 
some aspects of the problem of analogy. Barth limited the concept to  a 
single reference, ignoring longstanding distinctions. Przywara made the 
theme even more inclusive and central than is usual in Roman Catholic 
interpretation. Aalders urges that Barth allows too little, while Przywara is 
too expansive.38 Whereas one works too antithetically, the other is too 
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synthetic. Aalders believes that the problems which emerge from Przywara's 
exposition of the analogy of being are not due to his formal development of 
the idea as much as to his flexible application. Aalders, himself a Roman 
Catholic, complains that everything seems to fit together logically; yet we 
lack a clear statement of real difference.jP Przywara's analogy of being can 
function at the natural or supernatural level, enabling one to find or make 
connections. Being and consciousness, the formal and material, faith and 
reason, are affirmed together. Analogy identifies permanence in change and 
the presence of one and the many. Przywara premises that human thought 
in all its diverse forms is analogous. Experience discloses a pattern of 
meaning, a logos and depth which are discovered rather than invented. 
Analogy means that our knowledge is not self-complete but opens "over- 
out" to Truth and Being. 
In the longer view, a shift from analogy based on a static concept of nature 
to  one premised on history is evident. Przywara suggested such a changed 
orientation in his refusal to view nature-grace separately, but only in con- 
crete unity together. Przywara and Rahner both distinguish an abstract 
doctrine of human nature from the existential condition of man. Man is 
oriented dynamically toward or away from God. The human situation is not 
simply neutral, but has highly negative "demonic" as well as positive possi- 
bilities. Such an interpretation leads to an emphasis on history of salvation 
and even, in Przywara's case, to a theologia n-ucis. It is too simple to predi- 
cate perfection of the divine and then to ascribe attributes to God in terms 
of his unity. The real problem is rather to  give the divine names, love, good- 
ness, and righteousness, a relational context as well as religious meaning. In 
abstraction, they may be irrelevant if not meaningless in the face of evil. The 
meaning of revelation has been radicalized. As against traditional interpre- 
tation, new questions have been raised concerning the natural knowledge of 
God and the context in which faith is to be explicated. Creation has been set 
in a context of grace. In such a situation, the question of analogy is not 
simply epistemological. Analogy may be a barrier to hermeneutical investi- 
gation unless it is carefully defined. When its theological setting is clarified, 
it illuminates anthropology together with the basic claims of revelation. 
The positive gain from the Przywara-Barth debate appears in a new 
understanding of the interrelation between the analogy of being and the 
analogy of faith. To say the least, Barth's polemic made clear that the former 
cannot stand alone in a Christian theological context. Chavannes, defending 
St. Thomas's interpretation, argues that the analogy of being is not really 
isolated from the analogy of faith in his writings.40 Aquinas was not simply 
a philosopher but a theologian. Chavannes holds that both the analogy of 
faith and the analogy of being are relevant and necessary in explaining 
Aquinas's position. If this is the case, the interrelation between the two 
becomes the central issue. We have pointed out that Protestant commenta- 
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tors generally deny that the analogy of faith can be clarified as much from 
the analogy of being as Roman Catholic interpreters propose. Instead, 
priority is to be given to the analogy of faith and the analogy of being 
appraised from it. Of course, a more independent, dialectical relation 
between the two types of analogy appears among some Roman Catholic 
interpreters, more than has been true in the past. Przywara treats nature and 
grace in concrete synthesis in the world, not just as abstractions. A number 
of thinkers influenced by him, von Balthasar and Rahner for example, do 
not use "nature" to build a metaphysic but only as a limiting concept to 
indicate the separateness of creation from God even in its dependence upon 
him. 
Can one conclude with Przywara and Barth that the basic Roman Catho- 
lic thought form is the analogy of being and the Protestant form the analogy 
of faith? Only confusion will result if this duaIism is accepted without 
qualification. In fact, both types of analogy belong to each confession in 
varying expression. Much of traditional analogy theory has premised an 
unhistorical, metaphysical relation between man and God without cogni- 
zance of the "history of salvation." Protestants have reason to complain 
when the analogy of being is treated simply metaphysically, apart from 
consideration of the reality of human sin. However, the interpretations of 
von Balthasar and Sohngen, as well as Przywara and Rahner, cannot be 
criticized fairly on this ground. Are Roman Catholic thought forms basically 
ontological and the Protestant personal? Against such an oversimplified 
claim, it must be argued that Protestant interpretation has an implicit 
ontoIogy together with phiIosophica1 implications. Assuredly, Barth was 
correct in recognizing that analogy had been uncritically and too inclusively 
applied. In his own exposition, Barth did not succeed in transcending all 
traditional problems and distinctions. Nonetheless, there has been gain in 
the debate he engendered about the theologicaI context of analogy. Tradi- 
tional questions have been put in a new setting and first premises clarified. 
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